"Strategic Interaction Between Corrupt Governments in a Growth Model" [pdf]
Abstract: This paper
investigates the consequences of strategic interaction between corrupt
governments on economic growth. I derive a two country growth model where
corruption is the endogenous result of self-seeking government behavior. The implications
of endogenous corruption on economic growth are investigated. The model is
solved for both the competitive and cooperative corrupt equilibria. The
negative consequences of corruption can be significantly reduced through inter-governmental
competition, thus providing a further argument for fiscal decentralization in
the context of self-seeking governments. An empirical analysis of the effect of
decentralization on corruption is performed. I estimate this effect using two
measures of corruption and decentralization and correct for the endogeneity of decentralization.
The empirical results support the main theoretical result that
inter-governmental competition restricts corrupt behaviour.
Dissertation
“Government
Corruption and Economic Growth.” [Abstract]
Publications “Transparency: the key to better governance?” Book review for The Economic Record. Forthcoming December 2007. [Draft]
Other Research “Why Earmark? An Empirical Investigation into the Earmarking Behaviour of US States” (with Jeremy Jackson). Working Paper.
“Government Benevolence and Economic Growth.” Working paper.
“The Power of the Durbin-Watson Test in the Presence of Nuisance Parameters.” (with Tony Hughes). Unpublished manuscript.
“Assessment of Overseas Qualifications and Skills: a Comparative
Analysis.” Report to the Overseas Qualifications Board by the National
Institute of Labour Studies, Flinders University, Australia (with Mark
Cully). [Abstract]
