Working papers unpublished in journals or volumes are available upon request by writing the Center in Political Economy at Washington University, Campus Box 1208, 1 Brookings Drive, St. Louis, MO. 63130 or annette@wueconc.wustl.edu.
201. Schofield, Norman (October 1998) ``America, Britain, France and Spain, 1763-1804: Core Beliefs in America at the War of Independence and at the Ratification of the Constitution.''101. Weingast, Barry R. and William J. Marshall (February 1988) ``The Industrial Organization of Congress (Or Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets,'' Journal of Political Economy 96.102. McCubbins, Mathew D. and Thomas Schwartz (February 1986) ``Congress, the Court, and the Public Policy: Consequences of the One Man, One Vote Rule.''103. North, Douglass D. (July 1987) ``Institutions, Transaction Costs and Economic Growth,'' Economic Inquiry XXV(3): 419-428.104. Cox, Gary (May 1987) ``The Uncovered Set and the Core,'' American Journal of Political Science XXXI: 408-428.
105. Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast (March 1987) ``The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power,'' Journal of Political Science 81, pp. 85-.
106. Alt, James E., Randall L. Calvert and Brian D. Humes (June 1988) ``Reputation and Hegemonic Stability: A Game Theoretic Analysis,'' American Political Science Review 82, pp. 445-466.
107. Calvert, Randall L. (1987) ``Reputation and Legislative Leadership,'' Public Choice 55: 81-119.
108. Fiorina, Morris P. and Kenneth A. Shepsle (1990) ``Negative Voting: An Explanation Based on Principal-Agent Theory,'' in Information and Democratic Processes, J. Ferejohn and J. Kuklinski, eds. Champaign: University of Illinois Press.
109. Alt, James E. (April 1987) ``Crude Politics: Oil and the Political Economy of Unemployment in Britain and Norway, 1970-1985,'' British Journal of Political Science 17, pp. 149-199.
110. North, Douglass C. (1987) ``Institutions, Economic Growth and Freedom: An Historical Introduction,'' in Freedom, Democracy, and Economic Welfare, M. Walker, ed. The Fraser Institute.
111. McKelvey, Richard D. and Norman Schofield (July 1987) ``Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point,'' Econometrica 55: 923-933.
112. Hammond, Thomas H. and Gary J. Miller (December 1987) ``The Core of the Constitution,'' American Political Science Review 81(4): 1155-1174.
113. North, Douglass C. and Andrew R. Rutten (1988) ``The Northwest Ordinance in Historical Perspective,'' in Essays on the Economy of the Old Northwest, ed. by D. Klingman and R. Vedder, pp. 19-35. Athens: Ohio University Press.
114. Wallis, John Joseph and Douglass C. North (September 1986) ``Integrating Transaction Costs into Economic History.''
115. McCabe, Kevin A. (October 1989) ``Fiat Money as a Store of Value in an Experimental Market,'' Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, pp. 259-31.
116. Schofield, Norman (December 1987) ``Coalitions in West European Democracies: 1945-1986,'' European Journal of Political Economy 3, pp. 555-591.
117. Schofield, Norman, Bernard Grofman, and Scott L. Feld (March 1988) ``The Core and the Stability of Group Choice in Spatial Voting Games,'' The American Political Science Review 82, pp. 195-211.
118. Miller, Gary J. (1990) ``Adminsitrative Dilemmas: The Role of Political Leadership,'' Limits of Rationality, K. Cook and M. Levi, eds.
119. Eavey, Cheryl, L. and Gary J. Miller (1988) ``Constitutional Conflict in State and Nation,'' The Federalist Papers in Contemporary Perspective, B. Grofman and P. Wittman, eds. JAJ Press.
120. Hammond, Thomas H. and Jack H. Knott (December 1987), ``A Formal Model of Subgovernment Power in the Policymaking Process.''
121. Eavey, Cheryl L. (1991) ``Patterns of Distribution in Spatial Games,'' Rationality and Society 3, pp. 450-474.
122. Thomas, Paul and Thomas H. Hammond (Spring 1989), ``The Impossibility of a Neutral Hierarchy,'' Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 5(1): 155-184.
123. Hammond, Thomas H. and Paul A. Thomas (August 1990) ``Invisible Decisive Coalitions in Large Hierarchies,'' PublicChoice 66(2).
124. Nye, John Vincent and Hilton Root (March 1988) ``Capitalist, Pre-Capitalist: A Mistaken Antithesis.''
125. Marks, Brian (February 1988) ``A Model of Judicial Influence on Congressional Policymaking: Grove City College v. Bell.''
126. Schofield, Norman (May 1989) ``Smooth Social Choice,'' Mathematical and Computer Modelling 12, pp. 417-435, In a special issue entitled Formal Theories of Politics: Mathematical Modelling in Political Science, P. Johnson, ed. and as Volume 20 in the International Series in Modern Applied Mathematics and Computer Science (1989) Oxford: Pergamon Press.
127. Nelson, Douglas R. and H. Keith Hall (December 1988) ``Institutional Structure and Time Horizon in a Simple Model of the Political Economy: The Lowi Effect.''
128. Olmsted, Geroge, Judith Roberts and Arthur T. Denzau (October 1993) ``We Voted for This? Institutions and Educational Spending,'' Journal of Public Economics 52(3), pp. 363-76.
129. North, Douglass C. and Barry R. Weingast (May 1989) ``Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in 17th Century England,'' Journal of Economic History.
130. North, Douglass C. (1990) ``Institutions and a Transaction Cost Theory of Exchange,'' Essays in Positive Political Economy, James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
131. Brookshire, David S., Donald L. Coursey and Douglas B. Redington (December 1988) ``Special Interests and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods''.
132. Ladha, Krishna K. (March 1989) ``Money in Congressional Voting.''
133. Ladha, Krishna K. (1991) ``A Spatial Model of Legislative Voting with Perceptual Error,'' Public Choice 68, pp. 151-174.
134. Gilmour, John B. (May 1989) ``Hardball and Softball Politics: A Theory of Coalition Size in Congress.''
135. Ladha, Krishna K. (1994) ``Coalitions in Congressional Voting,'' Public Choice 78, pp. 43-63.
136. King, Ronald R. and David E. Wallis (September 1993) ``Optimal Level of Fraudulent Disclosure When Litigation is Costly,'' Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting.
137. Roberts, Russell D. (September 1989) ``The Interaction between Public and Private Spending When Government is Responsive to the Preferences of Citizens.''
138. Gauthier, Bernard (January 1990) ``Hierarchies and Delegation: Sequential Production Process in an Organizational Setting.''
139. Pastore, Mario H. (March 1990) ``Factor Proportions, Public Finance, and Property Rights on Labor Resources: A Test and Reformulation of Domar's Hypothesis on Slavery or Serfdom.''
140. Roberts, Russell D. (March 1990) ``The Tragicomedy of the Commons: Why Communities Rationally Choose Inefficient Allocations of Shared Resources.''
141. Dopuch, Nicholas and Ronald R. King (January 1992) ``Negligence Versus Strict Liability Regimes in Auditing: An Experimental Investigation,'' The Accounting Review 67(1): 97-120.
142. Nye, John Vincent (June 1991) ``Revisionist Tariff History and the Theory of Hegemonic Stability,'' Politics and Society 19(2): 209-232.
143. Gauthier, Bernard (May 1990) ``Agency Problems and Structural Arrangements within International Economic Organizations: The Case of the World Bank.''
144. North, Douglass C. (Fall 1990) ``A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics,'' Journal of Theoretical Politics.
145. Zenger, Todd R. ``Understanding Organizational Diseconomies of Scale: Small Firm Advantages in Resolving Agency Problems in R. and D.'' published as ``Explaining Organizational Diseconomies of Scale in R. and D.: Agency Problems and the Allocation of Engineering Talent, Ideas and Effort by Firm Size,'' Management Science 40(6): 708-729.
146. Ensminger, Jean and Andrew R. Rutten (1991) ``The Political Economy of Changing Property Rights: Dismantling a Pastoral Commons,'' American Ethnologist 18(4): 41-57.
147. Ladha, Krishna K. (August 1990) ``The Pivotal Role of the Judiciary in the Regulation Battle between the Executive and Legislature.''
148. North, Douglass C. (September 1990) ``Economic Development in Historial Perspective: The Western World.''
149. Zenger, Todd R. ``Why Do Employers Only Reward Extreme Performance? Examining the Relationships among Performance, Pay, and Turnover,'' Administrative Science Quarterly 37, pp. 198-219.
150. North, Douglass C. (1995) ``Institutions and Economic Development,'' Taiwan Economic Review 23(1): 1-24.
151. Gresik, Thomas A. and Douglas R. Nelson (May 1994) ``Incentive Compatible Regulation of a Foreign-Owned Subsidiary,'' Journal of International Economics 36, pp. 309-31.
152. Grossman, Peter Z. (July 1991) ``The Dynamics of a Stable Cartel: The Express 1851-1913.''
153. Miller, Gary J. (Forthcoming) ``Abnormal Politics: Possibilities for Presidential Leadership,'' in Researching the Presidency, George Edwards, ed. Agathon Press.
154. Gilmour, John B. and Paul Rothstein (1993) ``Early Republican Retirement: A Cause of Democratic Dominance in the House of Representatives,'' Legislative Studies Quarterly 18, pp. 54-68.
155. Ladha, Krishna (August 1992) ``The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech and Correlated Votes,'' American Journal of Political Science 36, pp. 617-634.
156. Eavey, Cheryl L. and Gary Miller (1995) ``Institutionally-Derived Stability: Cores in Two-Dimensional Voting Games,'' published as ``Subcommittee Agenda Control,'' Journal of Theoretical Politics 7, pp. 125-156.
157. Ladha, Krishna (1995) ``Condorcet's Jury Theorem in Light of de Finetti's Theorem: Majority-Rule Voting with Correlated Votes,'' Social Choice and Welfare 10, pp. 69-85.
158. Ladha, Krishna and Gary Miller (1996) ``Political Discourse, Factions and the General Will: Correlated Voting and Condorcet's Jury Theorem,'' Collective Decision Making: SocialChoice and Political Economy, pp. 395-410, N. Schofield, ed. Kluwer-Nijhoff: Boston.
159. Ladha, Krishna (1995) ``Information Pooling through Majority-rule Voting: Conodorcet's Jury Theorem with Correlated Votes,'' Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 36: 353-72.
160. Olson, Mary (July 1994) ``Political Influence and U. S. Regulatory Policy: The 1984 Drug Legislation,'' Economic Inquiry 32(3).
161. Tovey, Craig (January 1992) ``The Almost Surely Shrinking Yolk.''
162. Schofield, Norman (September 1993) ``A Theory of Coalition Government in a Spatial Model of Voting,'' published as ``Party Competition in a Spatial Model of Coalition Formation,'' Political Economy: Institutions , Competition and Representation, pp. 135-174, W. Barnett, M. Hinich and N. Schofield, eds. Cambridge University Press.
163. Schofield, Norman and Craig Tovey (August 1992) ``Probability and Convergence for Supra-Majority Rule with Euclidean Preferences,'' Mathematical and Computer Modelling 18: 41-58.
164. Schofield, Norman (January 1993) ``Political Competition and Multiparty Coalition Governments,'' European Journal of Political Research-+ 23: 1-33.
165. Lowry, William R. (Spring 1994) ``Centralization of Policymaking in the National Park Service,'' published as ``Paved with Political Intentions: The National Park Servies of Canada and the U.S.,'' Political Studies J 22, pp. 44-56.
166. Berg, Joyce, John W. Dickhaut, and Chandra Kanodia (November 1991) ``The Role of Private Information in the Sunk Cost Phenomenon.''
167. Olson, Mary (January 1992) ``Pharmaceutical Expenditure and Regulatory Policy in the NHS.''
168. Poppo, Laura (December 1995) ``Product Cost Disclosure and Renegotation Costs in Profit Center and Market Exchanges: An Empirical Test,'' published as ``Influence Activities and Strategic Coordination: Two Distinctions of International and External Markets,'' Management Sciences, pp. 1845-1850.''
169. Gilmour, John B. and Paul Rothstein (1994) ``Term Limitation in a Dynamic Model of Partisan Balance,'' American Journal of Political Science 38, pp. 770-796.
170. Gilmour, John B. and Paul Rothstein (1996) ``A Dynamic Model of Loss, Retirement and Tenure in the U.S. House of Representatives,'' Journal of Politics 58, pp. 54-68.
171. Drobak, John N. (September 1993) ``The Courts and Slavery in the United States---Property Rights and Credible Commitments,'' in Political Economy: Institutions, Competition and Representation, pp. 223-245, W. Barnett, M. Hinich and N. Schofield, eds. Cambridge University Press.
172. Boylan, Richard T.(August 1996) ``Voting over Investment,'' Journal of Mathematical Economics 26(2): 187-208.
173. King, Ronald R. (December 1994) ``An Experimental Investigation of Transaction Costs,'' Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, pp. 391-400.
174. Olson, Mary (October 1995) ``Regulatory Agency Discretion among Competing Industries: Inside the FDA,'' Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.
175. Schofield, Norman (1996) ``The Heart of a Polity,'' in Collective Decison Making: Social Choice and Political Economy, pp. 183-220, N. Schofield, ed. Kluwer-Nijhoff: Boston.
176. Schofield, Norman (1995) ``Existence of a Smooth Social Choice Functor,'' in Social Choice, Welfare and Ethics, pp. 213-246, W. Barnett, H. Moulin, M. Salles and N. Schofield, eds. Cambridge University Press.
177. Sened, Itai (May 1996) ``A Model of Coalition Formation: Theory and Evidence,'' The Journal of Politics 58, pp. 370-392.
178. Schofield, Norman (1997) ``Multiparty Electoral Politics,'' in Perspectives on Public Choice, pp. 271-295, D. Mueller, ed., Cambridge University Press.
179. Schofield, Norman (1995) ``Coalition Politics: A Formal and Empirical Analysis,'' Journal of Theoretical Politics 7, pp. 245-281.
180. Schofield, Norman (1996) ``Research Programs in Preference and Belief Aggregation,'' in Collective Decision Making: Social Choice and Political Economy, pp. 1-22. Kluwer-Nijhoff: Boston.
181. Smith, Alastair (March 1996) ``Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems,'' International Studies Quarterly 40(1): 133-153.
182. Miller, Gary and Kathleen Cook (forthcoming) ``Leveling and Leadership in States and Firms,'' in New Institutionalism: Institutions and Social Order, Eric Uslaner, Karol Soltan and Virginia Haufler, eds. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
183. Smith, Alastair and David R. Hayes (forthcoming) ``The Shadow of the Polls,'' International Interactions 23 (1).
184. Nachbar, John H. (March, 1997) ``Prediction, Optimisation and Rational Learning in Games,'' Econometrica 65(2): 275-309.
185. Nachbar, John H., Bruce Petersen, and Inhak Hwang (September 1998) ``Sunk Costs, Accommodation, and the Welfare Effects of Entry,'' The Journal of Industrial Economics XLVI(3): 317-332.
186. Nixon, David, Dganit Olomoki, Norman Schofield, and Itai Sened (fortthcoming) ``Multiparty Probabilistic Voting: An Application to the Knesset,'' in The Political Economy of Democracy. N. Schofield and I. Sened, eds.
187. Schofield, Norman (forthcoming) ``The C1 Topology on the Space of Smooth Preference Profiles and the Existence of a Continuous Preference Aggregator,'' Social Choice and Welfare.
188. Berliant, Marcus and Karl Dunz (October 1995) ``A Foundation of Location Theory: Existence of Equilibrium, the Welfare Theorems and the Core.''
189. Berliant, Marcus and Sanka De (forthcoming) ``On Revelation of Private Information in Stock Market Economies,'' Journal of Mathematical Economics.
190. Berliant, Marcus and Yves Zenou (December 1995) ``Labor Specialization and City Structure.''
191. Boylan, Richard T. (forthcoming) ``An Optimal Auction Perspective on Lobbying,'' Social Choice.
192. Boylan, Richard T. (February 1997) ``Can Existing Models of the Political Process Describe the Realtionship between Input and Output Tariffs?''
193. Shvetsova, Olga (January 1997) ``The Duverger Law without Two Partism.''
194. Pollak, Robert and Eyal Winter (January 1997) ``Random Matchings in Marriage Markets: Stability Is Rare.''
195. Winter, Eyal and Shmuel Zamir (April 1997) ``An Experiment with Ultimatium Bargaining in a Changing Environment.''
196. Schofield, Norman, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn, and Andrew B. Whitford (forthcoming)``Multiparty Electoral Competition in the Netherlands and Germany,'' Public Choice and in Formal Comparative Politics, M. Munger and M. Hinich, eds. Kluwer: Boston.
197. Boylan, Richard T. (October 1997, Rev. September 1998) ``Private Bills: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Lobbying.''
198. Boylan, Richard T. (February 1998, Rev. September 1998) ``Corruption and Staff Expenditures in the U. S. Congress.''
199. Schofield, Norman (forthcoming) ``The Heart and the Uncovered Set,'' Journal of Economics: Zeitschrit fur Nationalaeokonomie.
200. Schofield, Norman (September 1998) ``The Heart of the Atlantic Constitution: International Economic Stability, 1919-1998.''
202. Schofield, Norman and Itai Sened (August 1998) ``Political Equilibrium in Multiparty Democracies.''
203. Berliant, Marcus and Paul Rothstein (September 1998) ``On Models with an Uncongestible Public Good and a Continuum of Consumers.''
204. Nachbar, John (September 1998) ``Rational Bayesian Learning in Repeated Games.''
205. Shvetsova, Olga (October 1998) ``Assessing the Extent of the Endogeneity Problem in Institutional Selection: The Case of East European Election Laws.''
206. Boylan, Richard and Cheryl X. Long (July 2000) ``Size, Monitoring and Plea Rate: An Examination of United States Attorneys. ''
207. Rothstein, Paul and Gary Hoover (July 2000). ``The Welfare Economics of Autarky, Federalism, and Federalism Formation.''
208. Schofield, Norman, Daniella Gianetti, A. Martin, K. Quinn, and I. Sened (May 2000), ``Representative Democracy and Electoral Rules.''
209. Schofield, Norman (May 2000) ``Evolution of the Constitution.''
210. Calvert, Ranbdall (August 2000) ``Rationality, Identity and Expression.''
211. Calvert, Randall and Justin Fox (August 2000) ``Effective Parties in a Model of Repeated Legislative Bargaining.''
212. Norman Schofield (September 2000) ``Constitutional Quandaries and Critical Elections.''