Rationale

Philosophy of mind nowadays includes a significant empirical component. Many philosophers of mind see themselves as ‘cognitive scientists’ and make a point of distancing their pursuits from those of a philosophical tradition that distinguishes sharply between science and philosophy. The hope is that we can replace undisciplined metaphysical speculation with hard-nosed, empirically informed theorizing.

It is one thing to take seriously the fruits of empirical labors, however, and quite another matter to imagine that deep problems besetting the philosophy of mind will become tractable if only we reformulate our concerns in a way that makes them susceptible to empirical resolution. We are learning much about the brain, but, to take one currently prominent example, it is not easy to see how any conceivable neurobiological discovery or theoretical breakthrough could accommodate qualities of conscious experience. We are, it would seem, in no position to recognize a correct account of the physical 'basis' of the qualitative dimension of experience even if we had one. This is only to be expected. We can hope to advance a satisfying overall account of the mind only with the help of a clear conception of the range of possible accounts. Attempts to develop such a conception are hopeless unless they are accompanied by a foray into fundamental ontology.

Some would disagree. Consider, however, the longstanding problem of mental causation. Minds apparently interact with bodies: if you stub your toe, you experience a sharp pain; when you fancy a Whopper, you wind your way to the Burger King. Suppose our aim is to show how mental-physical interaction could occur. If we note that neuroscientists invest in causal principles linking mental occurrences and behavior, this need not settle the matter. We must first determine whether mental items as conceptualized by neuroscientists include what strikes us as most salient about conscious states of mind. Suppose we find the neuro-scientific account compelling. We must now ask whether the pertinent states are metaphysically apt for entering into causal relations. In answering this question, we must be mindful of the neuroscientist’s picture of the mind-brain. But we must consider, as well, how that picture squares with a broader conception of the world, one that includes empirical elements, conceptual elements, and a clear-headed overall assessment of the territory. Is the map of the world we obtain from neuroscience commensurate with the picture promoted by the chemist and the physicist, the psychologist and the anthropologist? This is a philosophical question, one we can easily lose sight of so long as we regard the philosophy of mind as just one ingredient among many in a unified science of mind.

Suppose this is right: what is called for is a dose of good old-fashioned metaphysics. An obvious worry remains. Isn’t metaphysics a perennial source of puzzles? How could we hope to answer vexed questions about minds by turning to an enterprise that seems, if anything, even more unsettled than the philosophy of mind?

These questions are fair, but they miss the point. My recommendation that philosophers--and others--interested in the mind look more closely at metaphysics is not premised on the implausible thesis that solutions to problems in the philosophy of mind can be extracted from metaphysical treatises. The idea, rather, is that the really deep questions about the mind are, whether we like it or not, metaphysical questions: philosophy of mind is applied metaphysics. Before we can hope to answer questions about the status of consciousness or mind-body interaction, we need at least to have some sense of the space of possible answers. Contemporary philosophy of mind has, in my view, narrowed this space unreasonably. The upshot is that the hardest problems we face are too often of our own making.

Although I have written extensively on these matters, the Seminar’s aim is not be to promote one or another metaphysical position. Instead, the Seminar is intended to provide an opportunity for participants to become aware of the options, their respective costs and benefits, and, most importantly, the extent to which unexamined metaphysical doctrines might be coloring their own thinking about the mind. In philosophy, unacknowledged assumptions operating in the background can be especially troublesome. Wittgenstein (1953, sec 308) made the point with characteristic dramatic flair: ‘The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that we thought quite innocent’.

I am, I think, in a good position to provide guidance through the territory without being heavy-handed or doctrinaire. If the continuing response of participants in my 1996 and 2006 seminars is any indication, a seminar of the sort I am describing promises to yield exciting results. (A list of publications of 1996 and 2006 alumni traceable directly to work begun in or inspired by the Seminar can be found here.)