U.S. CONGRESS
Anyone who reads the U.S. Constitution must come away with an awareness of the centrality of Congress. As it happens, understanding the U.S. Congress requires understanding many institutional features that the Founders di d not dream of, including interest groups, political parties, standing committees, the filibuster, and so on.
The study of the U.S. Congress is one of the most sophisticated subfields in the discipline of political science, with a distinguished history dating back to the time of Woodrow Wilson's Congressional Government. In recent ye ars, the field has been propelled forward by the introduction of formal models of congressional behavior--models that are not always correct, but always demanding of empirical and theoretical response. In order to claim competence as an Americanist, it is essential to understand the central works in this field, whether or not your own research interests are directed toward Congress, and whether or not you give credence to the most popular theoretical models.
There are many different approaches to the study of Congress: historical, biographical, institutional, descriptive, game-theoretic, decision-theoretic, statistical. This course will try to hit some of the highlights of each approach , and there will be a sampling of "classics"; but a disproportionate part of the readings will consist of state of the art research. There will be an emphasis on understanding the more formal theories and the more rigorous data analyses, since these works are the most difficult to read on your own outside of a classroom setting.
Requirements
There are a good many skills that graduate students can sharpen during the course of a graduate seminar: analyzing theoretical papers, analyzing empirical papers, making oral presentations, doing literature reviews, and (ideally) writin g publishable research papers of your own.
I would like to propose that students undertake the following tasks as a part of the course requirements:
1. Give at least two verbal presentations, each explaining and interpreting an assigned or optional reading during the appropriate weekly seminar. The paper may be either a theoretical or empirical work. Together, these two presentation s will be worth 10% of your grade. This will ideally be an informal, low-stress affair, with the goal of increasing your confidence in discussing political science topics in front of a group of your peers, as well as promoting a shared, cooperative approa ch to learning the material.
2. Write at least one short (3-6 page) analysis of a theoretical paper on Congress. What are the theoretical issues addressed? How does the author model the problem, and how does the author's model advance theory-building about Congress , if at all? This will be due the week after the paper has been read in class, and will be worth 20% of your grade, as well. If you wish, the paper may be one that you previously presented to the class.
3. Write at least one short (3-6 page) analysis of a primarily empirical paper, whose author intends to provide and analyze data which test (however loosely) hypotheses about congressional behavior. How appropriate is the author's data, and data analysis? Does the author provide information that allows us to conclude something about the hypotheses being tested? This will be worth 20% of your grade, as well.
4. Write a longer (8+ pages) literature review on a topic that you regard as a researchable question--election strategies, the role of congressional committees, determinants of roll-call voting behavior, influence of party leaders, conf erence committees, delegation decisions, etc. Ideally, you will also provide in this paper your proposed research strategy for addressing (in a potential future research paper of your own) the question addressed by the literature you are reviewing. This w ill be due one week after the last class, and will be worth 40% of your grade.
5. Finally, I will base 10% of your grade on participation and some problems that I will occasionally handout as "homework" to give you practice with some of the more arcane subjects. For example, the first day I may give you a problem that allows you to review some of the ideas and concepts dealing with majority rule instability. You will be encouraged to discuss these problems among yourselves, but asked to turn in a response that represents your own understanding of the problem.
Readings
Class discussion will be on the basis of the required readings. "Recommended" readings are intended to serve as a bibliographical aid for those writing papers on a certain topic or preparing for exams.
There are four books at the bookstore:
McCubbins and Sullivan, ed. Congress: Structure and Policy
Arnold, Logic of Congressional Action
Cox and McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan
Smith, Call to Order
Naturally, you need not all purchase these books if you can share among yourselves or have other access to the books.
Most of the reading consists of academic journal articles, primarily from relatively recent volumes of The American Political Science Review, The American Journal of Political Science, and The Journal of Politics. I feel it is important that you be acquainted with the cutting edge of research in this area. I may require additional papers that I find at the upcoming APSA conference in Boston. Several copies of these papers will be in the office/reading room, orga nized by week. The first few weeks' articles are there at this time.
The amount of reading in each week varies partly as a result of different degrees of difficulty. Some articles are quite rigorous; if you do not understand, read them as carefully as possible and come to class with questions for us to discuss. Other articles are paradigmatic presentations of research questions, hypotheses, research design, and data analysis. These are somewhat easier to read, although here, too, you may have questions about data analysis techniques. Other articles a re more descriptive, biographical, historical, or journalistic; these should be easier to read rather quickly.
In the first class period, I will lecture on majority rule instability, logrolling, and institutional responses to the policy mutability implied by these problems. These problems are the central underlying problems for many of the m ost challenging papers that we will be reading, so it will be helpful in future weeks if we all have a shared understanding of these core problems. If possible, you should read the Schwartz article before and again after class.
My Availability
I recently arrived in the political science department from the business school. The opportunity to teach bright Ph.D. students in political science was one of the primary incentives for making that career change. This is a cour se that I feel particular interest in.
Consequently, you need not feel that you are burdening me by coming by my office (Eliot 334) or calling me (5-5874). The easiest way to contact me with a question or to arrange a meeting is by e-mail (gjmiller@artsci.wustl.edu). I w ill try to reserve 10:00 a.m. on Monday and Wed. for students from this class; but if those times do not work out, then feel free to make other arrangements with me. I look forward to discussing important issues in American politics with you over the next few months.
U.S. CONGRESS
August 27
MAJORITY RULE VOTING
Read:
Schwartz, Thomas. "Votes, Strategies and Institutions: An Introduction to the Theory of Collective Choice." M&S.
Shepsle, Kenneth. 1979. "Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models." AJPS 23. M&S, p. 346.
Recommended:
Arrow, Kenneth. 1952. Social Choice and Individual Values. New York: Wiley.
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper & Row.
Plott, Charles. 1967. "Axiomatic Social Choice". AJPS 20:511-96.
Eavey, Cheryl and Gary Miller. 1995. "Subcommittee Agenda Control." Journal of Theoretical Politics 7.
September 3
NO CLASS SESSION
September 10
CONGRESSIONAL INSTABILITY AND COALITION FORMATION
Read:
Weingast, Barry. 1979. "A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms". AJPS 23:245-62. M&S.
Miller, Gary and Joe Oppenheimer. 1982. "Universalism in Experimental Committees." APSR 76:561-574.
Ferejohn, John. 1986. "Logrolling in an Institutional Context".In Congress and Policy Change, ed. Gerald Wright. Agathon.
Baron and Ferejohn. 1989 "Bargaining in Legislatures." APSR 83: 1182-1206.
Groseclose, Tim and James M. Snyder. 1996. "Buying Supermajorities". APSR 90:303-315
Recommended:
Riker, William. 1980. "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions." APSR 73:85-102.
Enelow, James. 1981. "Saving Amendments, Killer Amendments, and an Expected Utility Calculus of Sophisticated Voting." JOP 43: 1062-1089.
Riker, William. 1982. Liberalism Against Populism. Prospect Heights: Waveland.
September 17
DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM
Read:
Jones, Charles. 1968. "Joseph G. Cannon and Howard W. Smith: An Essay on the Limits of Leadership in the House of Representatives". JOP 30. M&S, p. 260.
Polsby, Nelson. 1968. "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives." APSR 62:144-68. M&S p. 91.
Rohde, David and Kenneth Shepsle. 1973. "Democratic Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives." APSR 67. M&S p. 179.
Brady, David and Mark Morgan. "Reforming the Structure of the House Appropriations Process: The 1885 and 1919-20 Reforms." M&S p. 207.
Brady, David, et al. 1979. The Decline of Party in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1887-1968. LSQ. 4:381-408. M&S p. 235.
Krehbiel, Keith. "Sophisticated Committees and Structure-Induced Equilibria." M&S, p. 376.
Katz, Jonathan and Brian Sala. 1996. "Careerism, Committee Assignments, and the Electoral Connection." APSR 90:21-33.
Recommended:
Shepsle, Kenneth and Barry Weingast. 1987. "The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power". APSR. 81:85-104.
Stewart, Charles. 1992. "Committee Hierarchies in the Modernizing House, 1875-1947." AJPS 36:835-56.
September 24
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
Read:
Cox and McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan, Chs. 1-3.
Fenno, Richard. 1973. Congressmen and Committees. M&S p. 147.
Weingast, Barry and William Marshall. 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress." Journal of Political Economy 96:132-63.
Krehbiel, Keith. 1990. "Are Congressional Committees Composed of Preference Outliers?" APSR 84:149-63.
Jones, Bryan, et al. 1993. "The Destruction of Issue Monopolies in Congress". APSR 87:657-71.
King, David. 1994. "The Nature of Congressional Committee Jurisdictions." APSR 88:48-62.
McKelvey, Richard and Raymond Riezman. 1992. "Seniority in Legislatures". APSR 86:951-65.
Recommended:
Fenno, Richard. 1973. Congressmen in Committees. Boston: Little Brown.
Krehbiel, K. and Doug Rivers. 1988. "The Analysis of Committee Power: An Application to Senate Voting on the Minimum Wage." AJPS 32: 1151-1174.
Munger, Michael. 1988. "Allocation of Desirable Committee Assignments". AJPS 32:317-44.
Hall, R. and C.L. Evans. 1990. "The Power of Subcommittees", JOP 52: 335-55.
Smith, Steven and Christopher Deering. 1990. Committees in Congress. 2nd Ed. Congressional Quarterly Press.
Hall, Richard and Bernard Grofman. 1990. "The Committee Assignment Process and the Conditional Nature of Committee Bias." AJPS. 33:459-90.
Maltzman, Forrest. 1995. "Meeting Competing Demands: Committee Performance in the Postreform House," AJPS 39: 653-682.
Groseclose, Tim and Charles Stewart. 1998. "The Value of Committee Seats in the House". AJPS 42: 453-474.
October 1
CONGRESS, COMMITTEES, AND INTEREST GROUPS
Read:
Wright, Jack. 1990. "Contributions, Lobbying, and Committee Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives." APSR 81: 105-128.
Brown, W. and W. Paik. 1993. "Beyond the Domain: Recasting Network Politics in the Postreform Congress." LSQ 15:414-440.
Grier, Keven and Michael Munger. 1993. "Corporate, Labor, and Trade Association Contributions to the U.S. House and Senate". JOP 55:615-44.
Austen-Smith, David and John Wright. 1994. "Counteractive Lobbying". AJPS 38:25-44.
Romer, Tom and James Snyder. 1994. "An Empirical Investigation of the Dynamics of PAC Contributions." AJPS 38:745-70.
Smith, R. 1995. "Interest Group Influence in the U.S. Congress," LSQ 20: 89-139.
Baumgartner, F.R. 1996. "The Multiple Ambiguities of `Counteractive Lobbying'." AJPS 39:521-569. With response by Austen-Smith and Banks, and rejoinder.
Evans, D. 1996. "Before the Roll Call: Interest Group Lobbying and Public Policy Outcomes in House Committees." Political Research Quarterly 49:287-304.
Caldeira, Greg and John Wright. 1998. "Lobbying for Justice: Organized Interests, Supreme Court Nominations, and the U.S. Senate." AJPS 42:499-523.
Recommended:
Olson, Mancur. 1971. The Logic of Collective Action.
Salisbury, Robert. 1984. "Interest Representation: The Dominance of Institutions." APSR 78: 64-76.
Langbein, L. and M. Lotwis. 1990. "The Political Efficacy of Lobbying and Money: Gun Control." LSQ 15: 414-440.
Wright, Jack. 1989. "PAC Contributions, Lobbying, and Representation", JOP 51: 713-729.
Hansen, John Mark. 1991. Gaining Access. University of Chicago Press.
Walker, J. L. 1991. Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions, and Social Movements. University of Michigan Press.
Ainsworth, Scott. 1993. "Regulating Lobbyists and Interest Group Influence." JOP 55:41-56.
Kollman, Ken. 1997. "Inviting Friends to Lobby: Interest Groups, Ideological Bias, and Congressional Committees." AJPS 41:519-544.
October 8
THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION
Read:
Arnold,Logic of Congressional Action, Part I.
Mayhew, David. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. M&S p. 18.
Fiorina, Morris. 1977. "The case of the vanishing marginals." APSR 71:177-81.M&S p. 30.
Jacobson, Gary. 1987. "Running Scared."M&S p. 39.
Hall, Richard and Robert van Houweling. 1995. "Avarice and Ambition in Congress: Representatives' Decisions to Run or Retire". APSR 89:121-35.
Bickers, Kenneth and Robert M. Stein. 1996. "The Electoral Dynamics of the Federal Pork Barrel." AJPS 40:1300-26.
Gerber, Alan. 1998. "Estimating the Effect of Campaign Spending on Senate Election Outcomes Using Instrumental Variables." APSR 92:401-411
Recommended:
Ferejohn, John. 1977. "On the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections." APSR 71:166-76.
Fenno, Richard. 1978. Home Style: House Members and their Districts. Scott,Foresman.
Jacobson, G. 1983. Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections, 2nd ed. Yale University Press.
Jacobson, 1989. "Strategic Politicians and the Dynamics of U.S. House Elections", APSR 83: 773-93.
Jacobson, Gary. 1990. "The Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: New Evidence for Old Arguments." AJPS 34: 334-62.
Gelman, Andrew and Gary King. 1994. "Enhancing Democracy through Legislative Redistricting". APSR 88:541-59.
Durr, Robert, John Gilmour and Christina Wolbrecht. 1997. "Explaining Congressional Approval." AJPS 41:175-207.
Hibbing, John and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. 1998. "The Media's Role in Public Negativity Toward Congress." AJPS 42:475-498.
October 15
IDEOLOGY, REPRESENTATION AND LEGISLATIVE VOTING
Read:
Arnold, Logic of Congressional Action Part II.
Weisberg, Herbert. 1978. "Evaluating Theories of Congressional Roll-Call Voting." AJPS 22:554-77.
Poole, Keith and R. Steven Daniels. 1985. "Ideology, Party, and Voting in the U.S. Congress, 1959-1980." APSR 79:323-99.
Kofford, Ken. 1989. "Dimensions of Congressional Voting." APSR 83: 949-62.
Poole, Keith and Howard Rosenthal. 1991. "Patterns of Congressional Voting." AJPS 35:228-78.
Goff, Brian and Kevin Grier. 1993. "On the (Mis)Measurement of Legislator Ideology and Shirking." Public Choice 76:5-20.
Cameron, Charles, et al. 1996. "Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?" APSR 90:794-812.
Recommended:
Kau, James and Paul Rubin. 1978. "Voting on Minimum Wages". Journal of Political Economy 86:337-42.
Fiorina, Morris. 1974. Representatives, Roll Calls, and Constituencies. Lexington Books.
Fiorina, Morris. 1975. "Constituency Influence" Political Methodology 2:249-66.
Kuklinksi, James. 1979. "Representative-Constituency Relations: A Review Article". LSQ 4: 121-140.
Bullock, Charles and David Brady. 1983. "Party, Constituency, and Roll-Call Voting in the U.S. Senate." LSQ 8:29-44.
Kingdon, John. 1989. Congressmen's Voting Decisions. University of Michigan Press.
Kalt, Joseph and Mark Zupan. 1990. "The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack." Journal of Law and Economics 33: 103-31.
Oppenheimer, Bruce. 1996. "The Representational Experience: The Effect of State Population on Senator-Constituency Linkages." AJPS 40:1280-99.
Box-Steffensmeier, et al. 1997. "The Strategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress: NAFTA". APSR 91:324-338.
October 22
COMMITTEES AND THE FLOOR: THE HOUSE
Read:
Steve Smith, Call to Order, Chs. 1-3.
Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1989. "Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a Heterogeneous Committee". AJPS 33:459-90.
Gilligan and Krehbiel. 1990. "Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature." AJPS 34:5331-64.
/Snyder, J. M. 1992. "Committee Power, Structure-Induced Equilibrium, and Roll Call votes." AJPS 36:11-30.
Londregan, John and James Snyder. 1994. "Comparing Committee and Floor Preferences." LSQ 19:233-66.
Birnbaum and Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch, Chs. 6-7.
Recommended:
Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
October 29
PARTY LEADERSHIP IN THE HOUSE.
Required:
Cox and McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan:Party Government in the House. University of California Press. Chs. 4-10.
Huckfeldt, Robert and John Sprague. 1992. "Political Parties and Electoral Mobilization". APSR 86:70-86.
Krehbiel, Keith. 1993. "Where's the Party?" British Journal of Political Science 23:235-66.
Krehbiel, Keith. 1996. "Committee Power, Leadership and the Median Voter: Evidence from the Smoking Ban." Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 12: 234-56.
Schickler, Eric and Andrew Rich. 1997. "Controlling the Floor: Parties as Procedural Coalitions in the House." AJPS 41:1340-75. With response by Cox and McCubbins and Rejoinder.
Recommended:
Sinclair, Barbara. 1983. Majority Leadership in the U.S. House. Johns Hopkins.
Rohde, David. 1991. Parties and Leaders in the Post-Reform House. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Binder, Sarah. 1996. "The Partisan Basis of Procedural Choice: Allocating Parliamentary Rights in the House, 1789-1990". APSR 90:8-20.
November 5
THE SENATE
Read:
Steve Smith, Call to Order, Chs. 4-6.
Fenno, Richard F. 1991. The Emergence of a Senate Leader. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, chs. 2-3.
Calvert, Randy and Richard Fenno. 1994. "Strategy and Sophisticated Voting in the Senate." JOP 54: 349-377.
Birnbaum and Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch, Chs. 8-10.
Recommended:
Sinclair, Barbara. 1989. The Transformation of the U.S. Senate. Johns Hopkins University Press.
November 12
CONFERENCE COMMITTEES AND BICAMERALISM
READ:
Smith, Steve. Call to Order, Ch. 7.
Strom, Gerald and Barry Rundquist. 1977. "A Revised Theory of Winning in House-Senate Conferences." APSR 71:448-453.
Hammond, Thomas and Gary Miller. 1987. "The Core of the Constitution." APSR 72:472-82.
Miller, Gary, Thomas Hammond and Charles Kile. 1996. Legislative Studies Quarterly. 21:83-103.
Birbaum and Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch , Ch. 11.
Recommended:
Tsebelis, George. Bicameralism.
Longley, L. D. and W. Oleszek. 1989. Bicameral Politics; Conference Committees in Congress. Yale University Press.
Van Beek, S.D. 1995. Post-Passage Politics: Conference Committees. University of Pittsburgh.
November 19
CONGRESS AND DELEGATION
Read:
McCubbins and Page, "A Theory of Congressional Delegation", M&S p. 409.
McCubbins, Mathew and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. Congressional oversight overlooked: Police patrols versus fire alarms. AJPS 165-179. M&S p. 426.
Calvert, Randy, Mark Moran, and Barry Weingast. Congressional influence over policy making: The case of the FTC. M&S p.493.
Arnold, R. Douglas. M&S. 1981. Legislators, bureaucrats, and locational decisions. Public Choice 107-32. M&S p.523.
Epstein and O'Halloran. 1998. Delegating Powers. Ms. Chs. 1-5.
Recommended:
Davidson, R. "Breaking Up Those `Cozy Triangles'." In Welch and Peters, Legislative Reform and Public Policy.
Moe, Terry. 1985. "Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: NLRB." APSR 79:1094-1116.
December 3
CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT
Read:
Epstein, David and S. O'Halloran. 1998. Delegating Powers. (Ms.) Chs 6 and 7.
Sullivan, Terry. Presidential leadership in Congress: Securing commitments.M&S p. 286.
Grier, Kevin, Michael McDonald, and Robert Tollison. 1995. "Electoral Politics and the Executive Veto". Economic Inquiry 34:427-40.
Rohde, David and D. Simon. 1985. "Presidential Vetoes and Congressional Response, AJPS 29: 397-427.
Kiewiet, Roderick and Mathew McCubbins. 1988. "Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decisions". AJPS 65:131-43.
Ingberman, Daniel, and Dennis Yao. 1991. "Presidential Commitment and the Veto." AJPS 35:351-89.
McCarty, Nolan and Keith Poole. 1995. "An Empirical Analysis of Executive and Legislative Bargaining from 1961 to 1986." JLEO 11:282-312.
Recommended:
Sullivan, Terry. 1990. "Bargaining with the President." APSR 38: 1167-1195.
Kiewiet, Roderick, and Mathew McCubbins. 1991. The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.