POLITICAL SCIENCE 5701

Experimental Design and Analysis

Tuesday 10:00am-1:00pm

Professors: Gary Miller Valerie Hoekstra
Office: Eliot 315 Eliot 323
Phone: 935-5874 935-7455
Office Hours: T&W 2-3 T 1:30-3:30
E-Mail gjmiller@artsci hoekstra@artsci



Course Description: This course is designed to examine experimental approaches in political science research. To this end, we will focus on both substantive and methodological issues related to experiments. The research we will examine is drawn from two broad substantive areas: political psychology and political economy. We will begin the semester addressing the methodological and substantive issues in the area of political psychology especially as concerns the research on public opinion. In this section we will primarily focus on such methodological issues as measurement, causality, internal and external validity, and the advantages and disadvantages of survey, quasi-experiments and " true " experiments. The second component of the semester looks at the substantive and methodological issues of experiments that look at and test formal and economic models of political behavior. In this section we focus on collective action, negotiation, coalition formation, and majority rule under various institutional procedures. The course will be run as a seminar where students are expected to participate in weekly discussions of the assigned readings. In addition, there will be some lab components where students will have the opportunity to participate in experiments to get a hands-on understanding of the experiments.

Course Requirements: Students will be expected to actively participate in weekly seminars. This means that students must come to class with a thorough understanding of the assigned readings and be able to engage in discussions of those readings. Students are required to submit five short (i.e. approximately 3 pages) papers that discuss weekly topics. You may choose which five weeks to submit a paper. These papers may not be summaries of the assigned readings. Rather, they should be reaction papers where you critique and/or offer alternative approaches to the issues at hand. The alternatives you offer may be either a " better " experimental design, or some other methodological approach to the question. Students must also complete a final research paper. The final paper must use some experimental design to address a political science question, and can be based on one or more of the shorter papers submitted. The experiment you design need not be implemented by the end of the semester, but you must submit a carefully and thoroughly crafted experimental design with a full literature review, theoretical discussion, and set of hypotheses for the specific topic you choose to study. Where appropriate, a full set of questions and experimental manipulations must also be included. At the end of the semester, students will present their papers to the class. Each of these three components (participation, five short papers and final paper) will equally factor into the final grade.


Course Readings:
The following book is available at the Campus Bookstore:

Kinder, Donald R. And Thomas Palfrey, Editors. 1993. Experimental Foundations of Political Science. University of Michigan Press. Ann Arbor, MI. (Hereafter K&P)


In addition, there will be readings on the syllabus that can be obtained from the political science departmental office.

Course Outline


Week Date Topic

1 9/2 Introduction to Experiments in Political Science &
Introduction to Political Psychology

Kinder and Palfrey, " On Behalf of an Experimental Political Science " in K&P
Kinder, " Coming to Grips with the Holy Ghost " in K&P

McGraw and Hoekstra: " Experimentation in Political Science: Historical Trends and Future Directions "

Sears: " Political Psychology "

2 9/9 Issues in Measurement and Design: Internal Validity, External Validity &Causality

Judd, Smith and Kidder. Chapter 4. " Randomized Experiments "

Shively. Chapter 6. " Causal Thinking and the Design of Research. "

Sniderman and Grob. 1996. " Innovation in Experimental Design and Attitude Surveys. " Annual Review of Sociology. 22: 377-99.

Schuman and Bobo, " Survey-Based Experiments on White Racial Attitudes Toward Residential Integration. " in K&P

Sniderman, Piazza, and Tetlock. 1991. " The New Racism. " AJPS.

Terkildsen, Nayda. 1993. " When White Voters Evaluate Black Candidates: The Processing Implications of Candidate Skin Color, Prejudice and Self- Monitoring. " AJPS. 37: 1032-1053.

3 9/16 Issues in Measurement and Design: Quasi-Experimental Research

Judd, Smith and Kidder. Chapter 5. " Quasi-Experimental and Survey Research Designs. "

Hoekstra, 1996. " Policy or Process? Reconceptualizing Support for the United States Supreme Court. "

Mondak, 1995. " Media Exposure and Political Discussions in U.S. Elections. " JoP. 57 (February): 62-85.

Franklin and Kosaki. 1989. " Republican Schoolmaster: " APSR

4 9/23 Issues in Measurement, Attitudes, Attitude Change, Persuasion and Framing: An Overview of Current Research (Part 1)

Shively, Chapter 4, " Problems of Measurement: Accuracy "

Shively, Chapter 5, " Problems of Measurement: Precision "

Converse, " The Nature of Mass Belief Systems " (recommended)

Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus, " Ideological Constraint in the Mass Public: A Methodological Critique and Some New Findings " in K&P

Zaller and Feldman, 1992. " A Simple Theory of the Survey Response " AJPS

5 9/30 Issues in Measurement, Attitudes, Attitude Change, Persuasion and Framing: An Overview of Current Research (Part 2)

Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder, " Experimental Demonstrations of the ` Not-So-Minimal' Consequences of Television News Programs. " in K&P

Judd and Krosnick, 1989. " The Structural Bases of Consistency Among Political Attitudes: Effect of Political Expertise and Attitude Importance."

McGraw and Glathar, 1994. " Value Conflict and Susceptibility to Persuasion. "
Implications for Democracy. "

McGraw. 1991. " Managing Blame: An Experimental Test of the Effects of Political Accounts. " AJPS

6 10/7 Political Information Processing

Ottati and Wyer. 1990. " The Cognitive Mediators of Political Choice: Toward a Comprehensive Model of Political Information Processing. " In Information and Democratic Processes, ed. Ferejohn and Kuklinski.

Lodge and Hammill, " A Partisan Schema for Political Information Processing. " in K&P

Rahn, " Candidate Evaluation in Complex Information Environments: Cognitive Organization and Comparison Process "

Lupia, 1994. " Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections. " APSR. 88:63-76.

7 10/14 Individual Choice

Kinder: " Rational and Not-So Rational Processes in Judgement " in K&P

Herstein: " Keeping the Voter ' s Limits in Mind " in K&P

Quattrone and Tversky: " Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice " in K&P

8 10/21 Collective Action

Palfrey: " Conflict Between Private Incentives and the Common Good " in K&P

Ferejohn et al., "An Experimental Examination of Auction Mechanisms" in K&P

Isaac, Walker, and Thomas: " Divergent Evidence on Free Riding " in K&P

Dawes, Orbell, Simmons and Van de Kragt: " Organizing Groups " in K&P

9 10/28 Bilateral Negotiation

Alvin Roth, "Bargaining Experiments", in Handbook of Experimental Economics.

Bottom and Studt, 1993. " Framing Effects and the Distributive Aspect of Integrative Bargaining."

Bottom. 1997. " Negotiating Risks "

10 11/4 Negotiation in Triads

Riker, 1968. " Bargaining in A Three Person Game " APSR. 61:642-656.

Riker and Zavoina, 1971. " Rational Behavior " APSR. 64:48-60.

Michener, et al. "Do Outcomes of N-Person Sidepayment Games Fall in the
Core".

Blake et al., "The Coase Theorem versus Coalitional Rationality"

11 11/11 Majority Rule: Committees and Elections

Fiorina and Plott, 1978. " Committee Decisions under Majority Rule: An Experimental Study. " in K&P

McKelvey et al., 1978. " Competitive Solution " APSR. 72: 599-615.

Miller and Oppenheimer. 1982. " Universalism in Experimental Committees "

Eavey. 1991. "Patterns of Distribution in Spatial Games,"
Rationality and Society. (October).

Wilson. 1994. "Disequilibrium and Measurement in Committee Games."

Myerson, Reitz, and Weber. 1997. " Campaign Finance Levels as Coordinating
Signals in Three-Way, Experimental Elections".

12 11/18 Institutional Rules and Procedures

Palfrey, "Agendas and Decisions in Government " in K&P

Eavey and Miller, "Bureaucratic Agenda Control" in K&P

Eavey and Miller, 1995. " Subcommittee Agenda Control " JTP.

Miller, Hammond, and Kile. 1996. " Bicameralism and the Core: An
Experimental Test. " Legislative Studies Quarterly.

Wilson. 1996. "Context, Institutional Powers and Leadership Traits."

13 11/25 Group Judgements, Condorcet Jury Theorem, Information and Democracy

Palfrey and Kinder, "Signal and Noise in Democratic Conversation", in K&P.

McKelvey and Ordeshook. " Information and Elections " in K&P

Ladha, Miller, and Oppenheimer. " Majority Rule Judgements "

Lupia, 1994. " The Effect of Information on Voting Behavior and Electoral Outcomes: An Experimental Study of Direct Legislation. " Public Choice.

14 12/2 ?
15 12/9 Student Presentations

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