

New Trends among the Hazaras:

From "The Amity of Wolves" to "The Practice of Brotherhood"

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The new Ethno-national consciousness of the Hazaras

In the last two decades there has been a striking rise in the political consciousness of the Hazaras of Afghanistan. { *1 } This has been manifest notably in the writings of Muhammad Isah Gharjistani and the preachings of Abdul Ali Mazari. It is also evident in the writings of histories and cultural reports of the Hazaras in English, notably Hassan Poladi and more recently S. A. Mousavi. It is further evident in the appearance of several nationalistic Hazara websites. What is striking about the websites is the pointed assertions of a Hazara ideology. In these sites the homeland of the Hazaras is now referred to as "Hazaristan" and in the latter weeks of 2001 they warned that the Hazaras could no longer be disregarded: "Hazaras will no longer sit idly by while our Afghan brothers decide what is best for them". But while there is a suggestion of a desire for independence the explicit emphasis is to demand a stronger role in national politics. A statement ("Declaration of a People") issued by Hizb-i Wahdat before the Bonn meetings in November, 2001, asserts that the Hazaras want a place at the table when the new country of Afghanistan is put together: "We have fought and will continue to fight for our rights as citizens of Afghanistan. ... This road that we have travelled on and painted red with our blood for two centuries will not come to a dead end!!!" (from the website). A central theme is the sufferings of the Hazaras: "No one in Afghanistan in their sane mind can claim that we have not suffered. We are the hardest working citizens and, yet, the poorest." { *2 }

We might regard such statements as fabrications of a combative minority but in fact there is plenty of evidence that established political consciousness among the Hazaras has broadened and become more explicit and self-conscious. The main institution representing Hazara interests is Hizb-i Wahdat-i Islamî ("Party of Islamic Unity"), but also there have long been several NGOs organized mainly by Hazaras. Many schools have been operating in the Hazarajat, for girls as well as boys, and even during Taliban times. And a number of Shi'a mullahs, following the lead of Mazari, preach about Hazara interests. Mousavi identifies a fundamental change in Hazara political consciousness in the period since the beginning of the Afghan-Soviet war. The rural Hazaras "... were able to take advantage of the breakdown of the old system [during the war] and the instability of the new regime in order to renegotiate their position in Afghanistan society. The changes that took place in Hazara society outside of Kabul and other cities during the 1980s were fundamental and

far-reaching." {3} This paper is about that process of "renegotiation" as it took place in Kabul in the 1980s and early 1990s.

Notorious fractiousness

The rise of a broadly shared Hazara national consciousness is notable because the Hazaras have been notorious for their fractiousness, at least as travelers through their area have reported it. A chronicler of Alexander's venture into the Hindu Kush in the third century B.C. says the following about the inhabitants of the area (who, if Mousavi is correct, would have been forbearers of the modern Hazaras): "the wild inhabitants are the most uncivilized amongst the barbarians: the bare aspect of the local scenery has petrified their minds." {4} A sixteenth century Arab traveller named Abi'l Fazl said of the Hazaras, "Each troop has been seized by cupidity, and they have thus become [divided] into bands and bands. They ... show the amity of the wolf" {5} Mountstuart Elphinstone, writing in early nineteenth century, says "They have constant disputes among themselves, so that there is scarcely a Hazareh tribe which is not at war with its neighbours. ... they have never any solid or useful confederacy." {6} Ferrier, who traveled through the region a few decades later says of one group that they "are constantly divided amongst themselves, either by the intrigues of subaltern chiefs, or by family quarrels; they are always scheming and plotting one against the other, and thus are ever exhausting that strength to their own detriment, which if consolidated and well directed, would render them terrible to the Afghans, with whom they are constantly at war". And of another group of Hazaras he says "the population is ungovernable, and has no occupation but pillage; they will pillage and pillage only, if it be but each other, and plunder from camp to camp." {7}

In fact, an Elphinstone or Ferrier venturing into the Hazarajat in the mid-1980s would have encountered a bitterly divided Hazarajat. Mousavi, who otherwise minimizes such negative details, refers to "internal fighting within the Hazarajat since 1982"; indeed in the period of 1983-1989 there was "intense internal fighting within Hazarajat [in which] ... thousands of Hazaras were killed" "It was common for members of the same family to not only belong to different groups, but even to fight one another. In Kalu, in Bamiyan, I was told by Karbalai Hossain, a Kalu Hazara: 'My brother and his entire family are followers of the Harakat-e Islami, but I am a Nasri, over the past few years we have fought one another several times.' "The main reason for this fractiousness, he says, was "the emergence of Hazara groups backed by Iran... [who] were forced into conflict with each other and with the Shura-ye Ittifaq" (another Hazara organization). {8}

Actually, having quoted these ugly comments, as if fractiousness were somehow in Hazara blood, I must

hasten to say that in some ways such descriptions are unfair. For one thing, many of those who have pronounced on the fractiousness of the Hazaras probably had little direct knowledge of them. Ferrier was unreliable on several grounds (at least Byron thought so), and Elphinstone, one of the finest of ethnographers, never got beyond Peshawar, and even then for only four months, and what knowledge of the Hazaras he acquired came from Pathan (Pushtun) informants, a people with whom the Hazaras have been at odds for centuries. In fact, what he heard in his time was hardly different from what a journalist heard early in 2002 about the Hazaras of Bamian: "It is a place where many Afghans fear to venture," he writes, "a putative land of bandits, murderers, and double-crossers. 'Whatever you do, do not go to Bamiyan,' said Hamayun, a driver ... 'They will cut your throat and steal your money and think nothing of it'." {*9} What the reporter found in Bamian instead, of course, were a lot of friendly people.

Also, it has to be acknowledged that the Hazaras have actually formed powerful coalitions at certain times in their history. A notable instance was in mid-nineteenth century when a coalition of Hazaras under Mir Yazdan Bakhsh of Besud rose to dominance over the eastern Hazarajat. They were a threat to the Amir of Kabul until one of his emissaries succeeded in luring Mir Yazdan Bakhsh into a trap, killed him, and ensconced troops from Kabul in Bamian. {*10} The second instance of broad Hazara unity took place in the latter nineteenth century in opposition to the rising power of the Amir of Kabul, Abdul Rahman, who in 1892 was seeking to form a state and enforce his rule over all the territories granted him by an agreement of the Russians and British. The troops he sent into the Hazarajat to disarm the Hazaras and collect revenue went beyond their writ and began to appropriate land and carry off women. The result was a wholesale Hazara uprising eventuating in the bloody Hazara-Afghan war. {*11}

The Hazara reputation for fractiousness is unfair on another account, for virtually every other ethnic type in the region has been similarly accused. Alexander Burnes describes of the Tajiks of Koh Daman and Kohistan in the 1830s as "turbulent and vindictive ¼. [T]heir blood-feuds are endless; a week never passes without strife or assassination, ... 'Blood for blood' is their motto and their rule; and as they still rigidly follow it up, every fresh act of violence increases the number of feuds, and extends the misery resulting from them still more widely." {*12} And the seventeenth-century warrior-poet Khushhal Khan Kattak laments the divisiveness of his Pushtun ("Pathan") kinsmen:

"In days gone by Pathans were Kings of Hind
And still in deeds of the Mughal they outdo,

But concord they know not, and they have sinned

Against God's unity, so come to rue:

Ah God! Grant them but concord, sweet refrain,

And old Khushhal will rise, a youth again.!" { *13 }

The question: why a strongly united Hazara nationalist consciousness now?

Indeed, the solidifying of a Hazara ethno-national consciousness in the period since the 1980s seems to be paralleled by a unifying trend among, especially, the Tajiks, and to some degree among the Pushtuns. The conditions that have fostered it are rather general, although they have operated differently among each of these ethno-national types. I here examine how those general conditions worked to effect the rise of Hazara ethno-national consciousness in the last two decades, one that is manifested in an articulate ideology, a formidable institution of organization and administration (Hizb-i Wahdat), a far flung network of institutions of reproduction such as schools and mosques where Hazara nationalist ideology is taught. I rehearse developments that contributed to this trend in the period of the 1980s and 1990s. My description has to follow two parallel tracks, for the Hazaras were engaged on both sides of the Communist/Islamist war (1979-1992), and the conditions that prepared the respective sides for a new ethno-national unity were different.

Developments on the Communist side

Hazaras were involved in the Communist movement, which remained secretive until the 1960s, and were part of the Parcham faction that broke away in 1967. (*14) As a result, when the Khalqi faction came to power in 1978, several of Hazaras were among a number of Parchamis who were imprisoned and tortured. But when the Soviets placed Parchamis in power in late 1979 a few Hazaras were given prominent positions, most notably, Sultan Ali Kishmand, who became Prime Minister; he would hold a dominant position in the Communist government to its very end. (*15) A prominent Hazara family that also allied with the Communist regime was that of Sayyed-i Kayan, the deceased pir of the Isma'ilis, whose base of power lay in Doshi. Several of the sons were executed by the Khalqis, but the oldest son, Sayyed Nâsir Nâdirî (now also called Mukki Nadiri { *16 }), and his brother Sayyed Mansur were still alive, although imprisoned, when Babrak Karmal came to power in 1980. Karmal knew Nasir from their time in Parliament in the 1960s and released him and the other surviving members of the family, after which Nâsir fled to England, leaving his younger brother Sayyed Mansur to take responsibility for the Isma'ili community as well as the family properties inside the country. Under Karmal Sayyed Mansur's Isma'ili forces were appointed the government

militia for Shibarghan and Doshi. Other Isma'ilis were given high positions (one was made governor of Bamian), and a number of Isma'ili young people were sent to Tajikistan for a Soviet education. And mosques were built in Kabul for the Isma'ilis. { *17 }

Beginning in 1984 the Communist government began to take measures to win over the opposition. To win Hazara support the Ministry of Tribal Affairs established a "Hazara Shura," and "published a magazine, 'Gharjestan', which dealt with the history, culture and social conditions of the Hazara¼ [It] was widely read among Kabul's Hazara intellectuals. ...[and] it promoted education among the Hazara, and influenced access to academic education in Kabul or abroad. The Hazara shura opened up a public arena for discussion of issues with a particular reference to the Hazara as a unity. For the first time the state made Hazara ethnicity politically relevant." { *18 } The next year, in the interest of bringing reconciliation the Communist government began to make clandestine contacts with some of the anti-Communist organizations, including the Hazaras, { *19 } and in December, 1986, Mohammad Najib, who had been recently installed as President in place of Karmal, declared a new National Reconciliation policy. { *20 } This may have been instigated by Mikhail Gorbachev, who had decided in that year to extract Soviet troops from the country. { *21 } In September, 1987, the Kabul government sponsored a large convocation of Hazaras from various parts of the country and offered them autonomy. In his speech to the group the most prominent Hazara in the government, Sultan Ali Keshtmand, said the government was going to set up several new provinces in the Hazarajat that would be administered by the local inhabitants.

Significantly, the delegates refused. { *22 } By that time there was a sense on both sides of the conflict that a new configuration of oppositions might in the making. Indeed, that sense would be legitimated shortly, for on January 11, 1988, Gorbachev announced that the Soviets would withdraw their troops from Afghanistan, the whole process to be accomplished by spring, 1989. Moreover, the Soviets and Americans announced an agreement to cease their involvement as of December 31, 1991. Clearly, a new situation was emerging: but what would it be?

This was the context of the formation of Shirkat-e Khosaran among the Kabul Hazaras at end of the year, 1988. The "Kabul Hazara business community [had] started to expand in the seventies, and experienced explosive growth during the war," says Harpviken. Members of the business community, many of them affiliated with the Hazara Shura, set up the Shirkat as "a joint stock business company ... to run industrial production, import and export," and to establish social projects, such as handicraft activities for the women

and courses in business economics, banking, foreign trade and English language. But the ultimate ambition was "to bring together the Hazara people of Kabul." { *23 }

Developments on the anti-communist side

An interest in drawing Hazaras together had been similarly taking shape among the rural Hazaras, most of whom were allied with the anti-Communist opposition. In fact, most of the Hazara peoples of the interior were less directly affected by the Communist government, as it effectively withdrew from Hazarajat in 1981, leaving the region to carry on its affairs autonomously. Most of the fighting was taking place on the perimeters of the Hazarajat, and the commercial traffic naturally inclined toward the less disturbed central territories where the Hazaras were dominant. The heavy traffic through the Hazarajat fostered road improvement { *24 } and a new florescence of social and economic life was created for the Hazaras, nourishing a growing sense of importance among them. But this florescence was marred by clashes of interest among the anti-communist Hazara forces.

Hazaras were involved in many different anti-Communist organizations. Some of them were mainly Shia but not essentially composed of Hazaras, such as Harakat-i Islami (led by Ayatullah Shaikh Mohammad Asif Mohseni) and Sâzmân-i mujâhedîn-i mustazafîn-i Afghânistân ("Organization of Holy Warriors for the Oppressed of Afghanistan"). Here I discuss those organizations that were essentially Hazara organizations. In fact, these two organizations avoided close alliances with the Hazara organizations until the very end.

Shorây- Enqelâb-e Ettefâq-e Islâmî-ye Afghânistân

The Communist coup de etat in April, 1978, had alarmed the rural Hazaras, and various groups quickly organized to resist the new regime. The most important early Shi'a anti-communist organization to form was the Shorây- Enqelâb-e Ettefâq-e Islâmî-ye Afghânistân (Council of the Islamic Revolutionary Alliance) led by Ayatullah Sayyed Behishti. A Shi'a from Bamian told me that

The Hazaras rose up in Saur (April) of 1358 [1979, a year after the Taraki coup]. They gathered in Waras.

They took Waras and then Yak Awlang. Then they went to Bamian -- by the end of Saur they were in Bamian. They held it for about 5 days. The leader was Sayyed Lamlam from Yak Awlang, from a family of Sayyeds near Yak Awlang.... Chaman Ali, a teacher from Yak Awlang, was his assistant.

But many were killed in Bamian. The government bombarded them and they had poor weapons and didn't know about what planes could do. But after that many people rose up against the government.

Shorây- Enqelâb was formed in the wake of this event. Representatives from all over the Hazarajat convened

in the summer of 1979:"sayyids, tribal chiefs, and a number of nationally prominent Hazaras, including some former parliamentary representatives." { *25 } Well-to-do non-religious elements initially dominated the council, but within a short time, the leadership of the Shura-y Enqelab was taken over by the sayyid contingent. Ayatullah Behishti was elected President of the council and his deputy (Ayatullah Husain Nasiri) and his chief military commander were also sayyeds. { *26 } Harpviken says that the major reason for the dominance of the sayyids, was the general resentment against the mirs and maliks (the local notables appointed to represent their communities to government offices); after the Communist state ceased to contest the Hazarajat the mirs and maliks lost their leverage, which was based on privileged access to the government. { *27 } At the same time the sayyids had the advantage of established informal ties among themselves -- through marriage, religious contacts and the like -- as well as their long established eminence and influence as religious figures and (reputedly) healers and diviners among the Hazaras. { *28 }

Sayyed Behisti and his associates did not hold the Shorây- Enqelâb together for long. Their administrative blunders undermined their own legitimacy and eventually caused the organization to splinter.

[A Shi'a from Hazarajat:] They ... divided the Hazarajat into seven *wulâyats* [provinces], { *29 } each with a wali [governor], a qazi [judge], and a *shaharwâl* [mayor]. It was strong then. They announced that everyone should have a gun -- every two families, one rifle. One year later they took the rifles away from the people for the "army". [Also] they told them they couldn't keep books by Ali Shariati [the progressivist Iranian writer]. So new groups formed in the Hazarajat then, in 1360 [1981].

Roy says the Shorây- Enqelâb organization collapsed because of internal corruption and specifically mentions that the sayyeds began to collect twenty percent of net revenue for the organization. { *30 }

Once in power, the sayyeds attempted to function as a government: they conscripted young men for an army, set up a system of taxation, and issued identity cards -- policies that smacked too much of the state coercion that was being opposed. When the young intellectuals and wealthy landlords expressed reservations about the growing strength of the sayyeds they were promptly ousted from positions of power. The sayyeds first moved against the young intellectuals, some of whom had been active in the Maoist political party, Sho'ley Jawid, and others inspired by Iranian radicalism.

... [T]he Islamists began to oppose landowners with nationalist proclivities and the intellectuals, many of whom were members of various splinter groups of Shulay- Jawid. Some clerics succeeded in excluding most landowners from the movement and executed members of the secular upper classes and Hazara

clerics espousing the Sunni faith of Islam. This situation forced many landowners and secularly oriented intellectuals to flee to Pakistan. Execution of revolutionary Hazara elites by the government and the inability of the surviving revolutionaries to organize themselves and provide leadership to the Hazara movement enabled the Islamists to seize leadership of the movement. { *31 }

The purges also deprived the sayyeds of popular loyalty. Shorây- Enqelâb withered to a single "front", which was in fact controlled by the independent-minded commander Sayyed Jadran in Ghazni. A man from Shibar who had met Behishti several times commented me in 1989 that Behishti displayed little evidence of leadership ability. "He is incapable of leading an organization, has no political awareness. He is a mulla only -- a pir to some people."

Behishti further weakened his cause by clashing with Khomeini. He refused to acknowledge Khomeini's religious preeminence, claiming a comparable status among the Afghanistan Shi'a, { *32 } and so lost any hope of support from Iran. The breach led to severe fighting among Afghanistan's Shi'a, for Iran supported a succession of other organizations in order to establish control over the Shi'a resistance movement. { *33 }

A number of Shi'a organizations took form as Shorây- Enqelâb broke up, and some of them got help from Iran. By spring, 1989, clashes with the rival organizations had brought Shura-i Enqelab to desperation and they sought help from the Kabul regime.

[Two Shi'a men from the Mustazafin organization, spring 1989:] The Shorây- Enqelâb organization has made a deal with the government in Ghazni to get arms. A friend of ours was present when they signed with Kishtmand [Prime Minister] for arms. They had to make this deal, they felt, because Khomeini had promised to give the other eight [Shi'a] parties about 70,000 weapons and some money to keep fighting. These groups have been fighting with the Shura, so they had to get help somewhere and they don't care where. In fact, also the local representative to the office here has gone to Tehran to get arms from Iran. Of course, they lie on both ends. ... Sayyed Jadran appeared on BBC radio last night to deny that they have joined the government. Even so, the commanders in the area are unsure how Shura will behave [in the future].

Other anti-Communist Hazara organizations

Most of the Hazara resistance organizations were obliged to accept help from Iran because their pleas for help from the Pakistanis and their sponsors, the Americans and Saudi Arabians, were ignored. The attitudes of the Afghanistan Shi'a to Iran, however, were mixed, and the involvement of the Iranian government in the

resistance movement, although unwelcome at first, eventually became vital to most Shi'a organizations -- although some groups remained apart and even at times fought the Iran-supported groups.

Iran was able to form organizations more to their liking through contacts with Hazaras who had formerly lived in Iran. After the oil boom of 1973 many Hazaras had come to work or study there -- this was besides the Hazara ulama, who had for years been coming to Iran to study theology. Moreover, as many Afghans were inspired by the success of the Iranian Revolution (Sunnis as well as Shi'as held Khomeini in high regard) the Iranians were able to develop networks of zealous Shi'a ideologues that formed the backbone of the Iran-dependent organizations. These organizations of course venerated Khomeini, at least officially, as their spiritual leader.

Sâzmân-i Nasr (Organization of Victory) was founded in 1978 or 1979. It was initially called Nahzat-i Hosayni, and was intended to be the Iranian organization of resistance. A Shi'a from Behsud described the Nasr organization as "dependent on Khomeini." Edwards says the organization was "composed primarily of young, ideologically committed fundamentalists." { *34 } These included a former deputy of Ayatullah Behishti and a man "who is reported to have spent time in an Iranian prison with Hujjat al-Islam Ali Khamene'i (later ayatollah and President of Iran). Islamists' agendas were to "bring unity not only in Hazarajat, but in the whole of Afghanistan, not only in Afghanistan, but even on the level of the whole world." { *35 } Emadi says that "[i]n 1983 Sazaman-e Nasr and Sepah-e-Pasdarān came into existence and succeeded in driving Sayed Ali Behishti out of his capital at Waras in Ghor ...". { *36 } Despite its gains, however, the Nasr organization lost support among some Shi'a because of its attacks on other Shi'a. According to Edwards the organization gradually increased its influence in the [Hazarajat], in part through superior organization but largely because of the financial and logistical backing received from Iran. [This was] ... accomplished in the face of opposition from the Hazara people in general and the Shura in particular [They] managed to strike a decisive blow against the Shura in the summer of 1984, when it forced Ayatullah Bihishti to flee his headquarters in Waras. { *37 }

A Shi'a from Behsud involved in a different organization said (in 1989) that

Nasr has a central committee made up of representatives from different places [in the Hazarajat]. The most notable figure is Sheykh Abdul Karim Khalili from Qul'i Khash of Behsud. Other prominent leaders are: Sheykh Mir Hosayn Sâdiqi from Turughman, Azizullah Shafiz from Behsud, Abdul Ali Mazâri from Dara'i Suf, Nâtiqi from Waras, Rahimi from Khujmiri of Ghazni, Shaykh Qurbân Irfâni from

Yak Awlang.

(Khalili as well as Mazari would of course become notable after this time. Khalili served as spokesman for the eight party Shi'a alliance in 1989, after Mazari's death became head of the Hizb-i Wahdat organization and eventually was appointed Vice President in Karzai's Interim Government.)

Harpviken says the

Nasr party was radically Islamist, following Khomeini's line. It stepped up its activities in Hazarajat in spring of 1980. Nasr was a merger of numerous groups. Some of them were established in Kabul in the seventies. At least one was established in Najaf, Iraq, and consisted of activists, mostly the students of Khomeini.... included labour migrants, religious students and theologians returning from Iran.... concentrated on building up local organization. It might be that elements of the secular radical groups have been influential in Nasr already at this stage. If that was the case, it would contribute to make the ethnicisms of Nasr in the last half of the 1980s more understandable.... some of the smaller Islamic groups, such as Niru and Hizbullah demanded relative autonomy for the Hazara already in the early 1980s. {*38}

Pâsdârân-i Jehâd-i Islâmî ("Guardians of Islamic Holy War"; also known as Sepâh-i Pâsdârân, "Army of Guardians") Despite Nasr's dependence on Iran and its apparent veneration of Khomeini the Hazara leadership of Nasr drifted out of Iranian control, and by 1982 the Iranian officials gave up on it. They established a new organization that would more directly conform to Iranian wishes, the Pâsdârân, which became the most effective opposition to Nasr. It was "an Afghan contingent" of the semi-military organization by the same name already functioning in Iran; they were "using mostly Afghan personnel but operating directly under the command of the Iranians." {*39} A Hazara in Quetta described this organization as "just a group of people that the Iranians put together. They were a few mullahs and some straggling Afghans whom they gave guns to." In any case, the Iranian based organizations acknowledged Khomeini as the preeminent sacred authority of these times.

Several other organizations were formed in the wake of the splintered Shora organization, founded in or soon after 1979. Even though religious authorities of varying sorts held prominent positions in these groups it was unclear how prominently sayyeds figured in the organizations. The following were described to me by two Mustazafin members from Ghazni.

· **Nahzat?i Islamî-ye Afghânistân** (Islamic Movement of Afghanistan) was founded in 1358 (1979-80). The

leaders were from Jâghorî; the most notable one was Iftikhâri, also (their representative in Peshawar) Rahimi.

- **Neyru-i Islam?i Afghânistân** (Islamic Force of Afghanistan). Prominent leaders were Sayyed Zâher?i Muhaqiq and his son Sayyed Hosayn Muhaqiq (from Behsud), and Hashemi (from Sang Charak in Jowzjân).

{*40}

- **Da‘wat?i Ittihâd?i Islami?ye Afghânistân** (Invitation to the Islamic Unity of Afghanistan). Its only strength was in Angora, Ghazni province (in 1989).

- **Hizb?i Islami?ye Rad?i Afghânistân** (Party of Islamic Thunder of Afghanistan). The leader was Qari Ahmad, also known as Qari Yakdista.

- **Jabhâ?i Mutahed-i Enqelâb-i Islâmi Afghânistan** (United Islamic Revolutionary Front of Afghanistan).

This organization was formed in 1988 from four very small organizations, all of which were organized in 1978

or 1979:Ruhâniyat wa Jawânân?i Afghânistan (The Spiritual and the Youth of Afghanistan); Islam Maktab?i

Tawhid (Islam, School of Unity); Itehâd?i Ulamâ (Union of Islamic scholars);Jambesh?i Mustazafîn?i

Islami?ye Afghanistan (Association of the Islamic Oppressed of Afghanistan);Fedayân-i Islam (Zealots for

Islam)

- **Ittihadî-ye Mujahidîn-e Islami-ye Afghânistân** (Union of Islamic Warriors of Afghanistan) led by Abdul Husain Maqsudi. {*41}

1982-1984:Civil War in the Hazarajat

In 1982, at about the time of the Geneva accords, the parties affiliated with Iran formed an alliance, the leadership rotating among the organizational heads.It would presage civil war and a new basis for alliance

among the Hazara anti-Communist groups, for unlike the traditional sayyed who dominated the Shorây-

Enqelâb organization the leaders of this alliance were formally trained Shi‘a clergy ("sheikh" among the

Shi‘a), and most of them had Islamist views. {*42} The struggle for the Hazarajat between the sayyed-

dominated and more traditional minded Shorây- Enqelâb and the sheikh-dominated Islamist groups began in

1982 when a group of Islamists from Shorây- Enqelâb joined with members of Nasr to attempt a coup.It

failed and the Islamists withdrew to their strongholds in Daykundi, Darra-e Suf and Turkmen.But the struggle

continued, eventuating in an all-out civil war that continued for two years.Alliances formed and fractured as

the contestants sought ways to survive in a shifting field of loyalties.In 1990 people who had fled the region

told me that in certain towns rival groups had set up machine gun nests across the street from each other.The

war against the Communists was neglected for the more immediate demands of internecine conflict.The

fighting would continue throughout the 1980s but its outcome was effectively decided by the spring of 1984 when Shorâ-y- Enqelâb was forced to flee its headquarters in Waras and relocate in Nawur. {*43}

The civil war reshaped the political and social landscape for the Hazaras because it resulted in the ascent of the trained Shi'a clergy (sheykh) to dominance. The sheikh had had little influence in the Hazarajat before, as there were few of them and few Shi'ite schools. But several schools of Shi'ite instruction were established, mostly after the 1960s, in Waras, Nilli, and Yakolang, as well as Kabul, and these schools produced a growing stream of graduates inspired by the rhetoric and political successes of the Iranian revolution {*44} and accustomed to the more egalitarian forms of interaction among the Iranians, in which learning and individual achievement (of the sheikhs) trumped the ascribed status of sacred descent (the sayyeds). So their rise entailed a new political rhetoric and new structures of authority, responsibility and social concourse: "... from a non-representative to a representative system. ... [which had] a larger potential to generate large scale solidarity." Unlike the ordinary folk who received direction from the sayyeds of Shoray- Enqelab, the troops of the Islamists were ideologically committed and well organized. {*45}

Trends toward unity

A fresh sense of empowerment was taking form among all Hazaras. The writings of Gharjistani were being read by the intelligentsia. Someone who knew Gharjistani well stressed to me that it was Gharjistani who made the Hazaras aware of their strength and ability to stand against those who had formerly oppressed them. Previously Hazara affairs were essentially dominated by the sayyeds and the wealthy elites (the mirs and khanawâdas), as most Hazaras were illiterate and easily exploited. But Hazara dependence on the sayyeds was contravened as a new generation, owing to the war, was brought into contact with the wider world. More were learning to read and becoming savvy about the ways of the world. And the younger Hazaras were internalizing Gharjistani's depiction of the sufferings and humiliations of previous generations.

Another consequence of the war -- unremarked by anyone -- was the disappearance (or submersion) of the non-Hazara populations of the Hazarajat. Although numerically preponderant, Hazaras had not politically dominated in their own region since their defeat by Amir Abdul Rahman in the 1880s. The Amir gave summer pasturage rights to Pushtun pastoralists, and perhaps owing to the pressures created by a national economy the best lands in some parts of the Hazarajat came to be held by non-Hazaras -- who called themselves "Tajiks" and were, like the Pushtuns, Sunni. The Shi'a Hazaras regained dominance of the region in spring, 1979, when Sayyed Behishti refused to allow the Pushtun pastoralists to enter their summer pasture

lands. Also, the new predominance of Hazaras and possibly the intense internecine warfare seems to have driven the Tajiks out of the region, or at least forced them into a lower profile. The Bamian markaz ("center"), once dominated by Tajiks, has become the capital of the Hazara organizations.

The changing configurations of power: 1985-1991

In the mean time, in the war against the Communists the only politico-military organizations receiving financial and military aid from the United States and other western powers were the seven Sunni organizations designated by Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI). The requests of the Shi'a organizations for help were consistently ignored. Evidently, being Hazara or Shi'a meant being marginal to those running the war.

But the political scene was changing. As early as 1984, the leaders of the Nasr party, despite their Islamist rhetoric, were beginning to promote a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-linguistic society, { *46 } a tactic that would become decisive in the next decade. Also, Iran's attempts to bring together a united Shi'a anti-communist organization finally resulted in the formation of an alliance in June of 1987, composed of eight Hazara organizations (but not including Shorây- Enqelâb). { *47 } And the great powers that had invested so heavily in war began to back off. Early in 1988 the United Nations brokered an agreement for the Soviet Union and the United States to stand down, { *48 } the Soviets commencing their withdrawal on May 1, and both powers terminating arms shipments to their clients by the end of 1991. { *49 } Also in 1988 Iran ended its war with Iraq, enabling a redirection of attention to Afghanistan.

That a new alignment of powers was in the offing was further indicated in, on the one hand, the Kabul government's offer of autonomy to the Hazaras, and on the other hand the Hazara delegates' refusal of the offer. { *50 } The Hazaras were seeing new possibilities. Although Pakistan continued to ignore the requests of the Shi'a organizations for military support, Iran was now trying to bridge to even the Sunni organizations. { *51 } Also, the refusal in February, 1989, of the Sunni organizations to agree on the role of the Shi'a in a post-war government emphasized to the Shi'a Hazaras an urgency somehow to insert themselves into the political process. In July, 1989, the disparate Hazara organizations that had been fighting each other endorsed a new alliance in Bamian, calling it Hizb-i Wahdat ("Party of Unity"). Many Hazara fronts joined. { *52 } The educated clergy who effected this process, in the face objections by many commanders, brought the mirs and khanawâdas who had been alienated by the sayyeds back into the new organization, effectively recovering administrative talent previously lost. { *53 }

Hizb-i Wahdat would grow in importance with the approach of an uncertain future. A new configuration of power was imminent, but what it would be no one knew. The leaders of Wahdat guardedly looked for new avenues of opportunity. They gave no hint of a desire for Hazara autonomy; instead they argued for the rights of all citizens of the country, presumably in the interest of securing their own rights. "The ambiguity of Hezb-e Wahdat is that in its official discourse, the religious aspect is in front, while in its practice it is essentially a Hazara movement, with a strong undertone of nationalism." { *54 }

Collapse and reconstitution:1991-1992

After the Soviet Union withdrew troops in spring 1989, the Kabul regime, against most predictions, held on. But the anticipated termination of all outside support on December 31, 1991, loomed. The search for trustworthy allies grew in urgency. Hazaras in other political organizations -- such as Harakat-i Islami, which was dominated by non-Hazaras, and the Nahzat organization -- began to regard Wahdat as a possible safe haven. { *55 } Pressure to join Wahdat mounted, especially for those in the smaller organizations that were vulnerable to intimidation. Eventually, even the staunchly anti-Islamist and anti-nationalist Shi'a organization, Mustaz'affin, joined Wahdat in 1991. { *56 } Whenever new organizations succumbed, their leaders were given positions in Wahdat, a policy attributed to the influence of Mazari. As a key founder of Wahdat and head Mazari insisted on this policy, one that marked a break with Iran. { *57 } Harpviken says that Wahdat accepted all kinds of Hazaras, eventually even former government officials, by emphasizing an ethno-national Hazara identity instead of an Islamist one. The Islamists within the organization repeatedly objected, appealing to the views of another cleric, Akbari, one of the few Qizilbash in the organization, but they failed to hold back the tide. Ordinary Hazara Shi'a from all sides were being drawn to (and accepted in) Wahdat whereas the Qizilbash and the Hazara Sayyed Shi'as inclined toward Sheikh Mohsini's Harakat-i Islami. { *58 } But not everyone succumbed: a key figure in the Mustazafin party, Sayyed Hosaini, refused to join Wahdat because of its Islamist inclinations, and eventually paid for his intransigence with his life; he was killed by Wahdat in Kabul in summer 1992.

The preeminent figures in this trend toward union within Wahdat were the clerics. Shi'a scholars displaced two kinds of notables among the Hazaras: the Hazara Sayyeds, who were venerated, sometimes feared, for their putative spiritual powers; and the mirs, arbabs and maliks who served as representatives of local communities to the government. The rise of the clergy was perhaps due to the influence of Iran, which had long attempted, by means of the learned clergy, to control the Hazara anti-communist movement. Mazari's policy was on the

one hand to avoid the coercive influence of Iran and on the other hand to persuade Hazaras of all stripes, including most of the Islamists, that in the long run they had a common interest as an ethno-national entity. "Mazari succeeded to bring together the many sections, forces and classes within Hazara and Shi'a society and to represent a united people" { *59 } He accepted all comers: even Isma'ili Hazaras, a minority normally scorned and persecuted by other Shi'a. "The emergence of such a political leader among the Hazara has few historic precedents." { *60 }

But the Hazaras as a whole were still divided, Communists versus anti-communist. The two groups on opposing sides of a decade-long war had different experiences in the 1980s and different conceptions of the national situation. But clandestine attempts at rapprochement were made late in the 1980s and the Hazara organizations would unite in 1992 as the state collapsed and the capital city fell into confusion. A common sense of ethno-national patriotism had been forming in parallel: among Hazaras in the city, in the provinces, and in Pakistan and Iran.

The most dramatic sign that the Hazaras of the city were shifting their loyalties was the resignation of Prime Minister Sultan Ali Kistmand in the summer of 1991, who declared his support for the Shi'a opposition, demanded autonomy for the Hazarajat, and Hazara representation in the central government. { *61 } The interests of the Hazaras, in the city and in the provinces, were converging.

By the end of 1991 the United Nations had hatched a plan for the Kabul government to be handed over to the opposition's Interim Government in May of 1992, but events overran it. { *62 } Already Iran was cobbling together a "Northern Alliance" in Mazar-i Sharif, composed of non-Pushtun organizations: Mazari's Hizb-i Wahdat, Ahmad Shah Mas'ud's Jami'at-i Islami, Abdul Rashid Dostam's Uzbek militia, and Sayyed Mansur's Isma'ili militia. Ethno-nationalist loyalties -- Pushtun (Hizb-i Islamî, Ittehad-i Islâmî, Jabha-y Nijat-e Millî), Tajik (Jami'at-i Islamî), Uzbek (Jombesh-e Mellî-ye-Islâmî), Hazara (Wahdat) -- previously concealed under the dichotomy of Communism versus Islamism, were ever more obvious. So was the involvement of outside powers: Iran was supporting Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek groups defying the Pushtun organizations that were supported by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The importance of ethnic identity in the increasingly uncertain situation burst onto the surface in January, 1992, when President Najibullah tried to install a Pushtun general over Uzbek government troops in Mazar-i Sharif. The general in charge, Mu'min, refused to step down, and was supported by Sayyed Mansur and by Dostam. Dostam's Uzbek officers at Hairatan mutinied. Then the lines began to cross: The Isma'ilis and some other government forces formed an alliance with Mas'ud's

opposition force, Jami'at-i Islami. On March 18th Najibullah offered to abdicate in favor of a transition government, but it was too late; his army was already disintegrating. On the night of April 15 he was caught trying to fly out of the country. { *63 }

With the collapse of the political and military structure of the Communist regime the paradigm of oppositions that had organized public loyalties for more than a decade vanished. { *64 } There was no government to fight for, no government to fight, and no more need to conceal the scramble for new allies. Most of the Hazaras in Kabul had already formed contacts with members of the resistance, through kinsmen or neighbors. Kabuli Hazaras, defectors from the Kabul regime and clandestine agents of the resistance groups, formed new alliances. Without central coordination, even before the fighting men of the resistance organizations entered the city, Hazaras were taking control of their neighborhoods. They went for police-stations or Khad offices where guns and ammunition were stashed. Leaders of the Khosaran company were registering volunteers, even before Najibullah tried to flee, enlisting as many as twenty neighborhood defense groups composed of fifteen to twenty-five volunteers. Other self-defense groups quickly joined Khosaran. Because the Hazaras were so numerous -- perhaps half the city was Hazara now { *65 } -- and because "they started early" (Harpviken) they soon held large sectors of Kabul.

Wahdat -- joined by troops defecting from neighboring military installations -- walked into a position of command in the city. Leaders among the Kabul Hazaras welcomed them, and they in turn were welcomed into the party and assigned prominent positions (again in the face of objections by the Wahdat Islamists). Former government officials played a key role in securing for Wahdat its control of about half the city by the end of April.

The scramble by the Hazaras on the two sides of the previous twelve years of war revealed their sense of vulnerability. Connections based on familiar relations of trust -- family, friends, co-sectarians -- took on a new importance. The bodies that had formerly claimed the right to exert power -- the Communist state and the Islamist politico-military organizations -- had already lost their legitimacy among the common people. Now they lost their relevance, even as useful fictions. The new configuration of loyalties became more evidently ethno-nationalist. And by this time, owing to the massive exodus of the Pushtun and Tajik residents of the city as well as the infusion of Hazaras from the countryside for decades, nearly half the population of Kabul was Hazara. As the Sunni parties arrived in the city Wahdat became the ultimate guarantor for the Hazaras, arranging for their security and representing their interests. { *66 }

The battle of Kabul 1992-1996

In the mean time the Soviet Union was dissolving. New states were appearing in Central Asia. To Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia Afghanistan was no longer a "Great Game" barricade between imperial spheres but a corridor of opportunity, a link to the natural wealth of Central Asia. Kabul, always strategic, became more so, as the anti-communist organizations converged upon it. The Hazaras, as they firmed up their positions in the city, would be at the vortex of the battle for its control until 1995, when they withdrew in defeat; the last of their major adversaries, Jami'at-i Islami, would also be driven out a few months later by an entirely new force, the Taliban. The battle for Kabul would at times reflect the ethno-nationalist biases of the fighting organizations but at other times reveal the practical exigencies of war. But even as the people of Kabul suffered the most brutal and prolonged conflict in the city's history, the Western world gave no heed, for it was transfixed by events in Eastern Europe. {*67}

As the opposition organizations entered Kabul, Hizb-i Wahdat was in a position to demand recognition for the Hazaras that had previously been denied them. They had to fight for it. Hostilities were focused on West Kabul, which housed the largest concentration of Hazaras in the city. The first armed clash started on June 2 between Wahdat and Sayyaf's Saudi Arabia-supported mainly Pushtun organization, Ittehad-i Islâmî Barâ-yi Âzâdî-yi Afghânistân. Apparently owing to Wahdat's strong showing in that four-day contest Wahdat was promised more representation in the government, including the strategic position of Minister of Security. {*68} But Saudi Arabia had become the funding source for the new government of Burhanuddin Rabbani and the Saudi anti-Shi'a bias contributed to a continuance of hostilities toward Wahdat. {*69} When Mas'ud's troops sought to disarm the Hazaras early in November a new conflict broke out that continued intermittently for some months. The most notable event in that conflict was what the Hazaras remember as the Afshar massacre: on Feb 11, 1993, Mas'ud's mostly Tajik forces (Jami'at-i Islami) from positions on the north and south, assisted by Sayyaf's mostly Pushtun forces (Ittehad-i Islami) on the west turned their guns on the Afshar district of West Kabul. Wahdat was forced to seek alliances with some of its former enemies, first with the Pushtun-composed party of Hikmatyar's Hizb-i Islami, with whom it had long been at odds, and eventually with Dostam's Uzbek organization, Jombesh-e Mellî-ye-Islâmî, and Sibghatullah Mujaddidi's mostly Pushtun Jabha-y Nijat-e Milli. {*70}

A new factor, the Taleban: 1996-2001

By 1995 another organization had arrived on the scene, the Taliban, supported by Pakistan and fortified by

young Pushtun volunteers from Pakistan. The conflict with the Taliban would force still another configuration of oppositions, for the several parties of the North had formed a new alliance to resist the Taliban; they included the forces of Mas'ud, Sayyaf, and Dostam as well as Wahdat. For the Hazaras the fighting with Taliban forces was especially terrible. In 1998 there were massacres on both sides, between Hazaras and Taliban, in Mazar-i Sharif. In May, 2000, there was a massacre of Hazaras near the Robatak Pass on the border between Baghlan and Samangan provinces. There were several clashes in Yakaolang and on January 8, 2001, a pogrom of killing Hazaras began that would last four days, according to Human Rights Watch. Also, apparently as the Taliban withdrew from Bamian for the last time, they again killed a number of Hazaras. Early in 2002 over a hundred mass graves were discovered in Bamian, apparently dug during the last days of the Taliban there (Filipov 2002; see also the Hazara websites www.hazaraunity.com; www.shia-network.com, www/hazara.net).

Of all the losses, one of the most shattering to Wahdat was the murder of Mazari by the Taliban early in 1996. His death was mourned by thousands. His body was carried on foot from Ghazni to its resting place in Mazar-i Sharif in a procession that took over a week and, according the website, collected 60,000 mourners along the way. He was to be buried on Sunday, March 26, but "because of the huge number of mourners wishing to pay their last respects $\frac{1}{4}$, the burial had to be delayed until Monday." The massacres and the assassination of Mazari added to the sense of victimhood already established among the Hazaras.

The situation in spring and summer, 2002

As a government forms and seeks to accommodate the diverse populations that make up Afghanistan the Hazaras, always aware of their distinctiveness owing to their subaltern position in the society, seem to have developed a janus-like double pose. One pose is the explicitly chavanistic Hazara ethno-nationalism, and the other is an eagerness for a place in the new nation under construction. A mythology of suffering defined the Hazara consciousness as the stories of massacre in the recent wars were added to those recounted from the time of Abdul Rahman. It was also fostered in the celebration of Abdul Ali Mazari's heroic qualities. Mazari "is no longer an individual, but the personification of a nation. Today our society's every justice-seeking Hazara and citizen is another Mazari" (mazari.cjb.net, website of the Martyr Abdul Ali Mazari Cultural Centre).

At the same time the Hazaras are eager to have a place in the new country of Afghanistan. Rather than hints of a demand for autonomy there is an appeal for multi-ethnicity: The Hizb-i Wahdat website affirms a desire

for "human rights and Islamic brotherhood for all our country's peoples," and calls for "brotherhood amongst the different peoples, not for enmity." It quotes Mazari: "we have never had anything in Afghanistan and do not want any advantages now. We simply want to crush the monster of monopoly." Mazari "wanted to create an atmosphere of brotherhood and partnership." "Our only wish for our people is that being Hazara should no longer be a crime. ... [T]he shameful and unforgivable ideology of ethnic supremacy has, over the past century led to horrendous crimes and planted the seed of conflict, and held back social and economic progress, political and cultural evolution in Afghanistan, by exercising cultural, political and social oppression^{1/4}." Mazari warned that that "if we do not put an end to ethnic supremacy, recognize the motives and perpetrators of this tragedy, and bring those responsible to justice, soon all of Kabul and Afghanistan will be the scene of several Afshars. ^{1/4} [W]e must stand together against domination by any political party, ethnic group or language [group], and co-operate in establishing peace, and building a free and developed country, a country of equal brothers and sisters, a country of ideals, hopes and dreams." (www.geocities.com/mohaqiq; www.hazara.net)

Admittedly, Hizb-i Wahdat does not speak for all Hazaras. Many of the intelligentsia are reluctant to be associated with the party, and Hazara women have complained about Wahdat. { *71 } And not all Hazaras are affiliated with the party. The Isma'ili Hazaras remain separate, and owing to a new agreement between their Imam, the Aga Khan, and Hamid Karzai, their influence could become stronger. Nevertheless, Hezb-e-Wahdat is a broadly based political expression of the Hazaras collectively. The Wahdat organization represents a political bond among Hazaras that has not been seen for a century. It has taken form in the special circumstances of its time. Gharjistani had long been persuading his compatriots that the Hazaras shared a common history of suffering and oppression. The persistent refusal of Pakistan's ISI to recognize the Hazaras in the war against the Soviets made evident to them their demeaned status in the eyes of the other organizations. Iran's infusion of wealth made unification more feasible. The collapse of the paradigm of oppositions that had informed the Afghanistan war for more than a dozen years allowed Hazaras from opposite sides to come together in a time with relatively little haggling and embarrassment -- the imminent arrival of other fighting groups in the capital city -- none of whom had given the Hazaras a farthing -- quickened the bonding process. Mazari's magnanimity to his former enemies in each of the unions with other groups was surely a factor in this process. And his murder by the Taliban gave to Hizb-i Wahdat's hagiographic mythology of vicimization a vivid recent illustration. A nationalistic Hazara organization took

form in a world broadly tending toward nationalism as the Soviet Union collapsed. So the Hizb-i Wahdat movement among the Hazaras was a local and particular expression of the wider trends. The party is, as one Hazara put it to me, strong because of what it stands for and because of the person who created it (Mazari), but it is weak because of the current leadership (Khalili).

The organization will surely influence the course of affairs as the new government takes form. Its appeals for a country that fosters brotherhood among its disparate interest groups are a departure from the Hazaras' reputed fractiousness, but in so far as their professed ideals materialize Afghanistan will be a better place. {*72}

Notes

- *1. I have not been in the Hazarajat for many years. What I have to say about the Hazaras here is mainly based on the research and publication of other scholars. In a few cases I quote individuals who remain unnamed in the interest of protecting them.
- *2. From the Wahdat website, http://www.geocities.com/wahdat_magazine, February 2, 2002.
- *3. S. A. Mousavi, *The Hazaras of Afghanistan: An Historical, Cultural, Economic and Political Study* (Surrey, England, Curzon, 1988), p. 179.
- *4. J. P. Ferrier, *Caravan Journeys and Waderings in Persia, Afghanistan, Turkistan and Beloochistan; with Historical Notices of the Countries lying between Russia and India*, translated from the original unpublished manuscript by Capt. William Jesse (London, 1857), p. 222.
- *5. quoted in H. F. Schurmann, *The Mongols of Afghanistan*. (Leiden: Mouton & Co, 1962), p. 117).
- *6. M. Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul*. (London: Longman et al. 1819), p. 485.
- *7. Ferrier, *Carravan Journeys*, pp. 219-221.
- *8. Mousavi, *Hazaras*, pp. 177, 180, 183, 186.
- *9. David Filipov, "Hazaras hold key role after Taliban destruction," *Boston Globe* 2/14/2002.
- *10. Charles Masson, *Narrative of Various Joureneys in Beloochistan, Afghanistan, and the Panjab, Including a Residence in Those Countries from 1826 to 1836*, (London: Richard Bentley, 1842), Vol II.
- *11. M. H. Kakar, *Afghanistan: A Study in Internal Political Developments 1880-1896*, (Kabul: The author, 1971), p. 176-7).
- *12. Alexander Burnes, *Cabool: A Personal Narrative of a Journey to, and Residence in, That City, in the Years 1836, 7, and 8*, (London: John Murray, 1961[1842]), p. 114.
- *13. Quoted in Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans: Five Hundres B.C. to A.D. Nineteen Hundres Fifty-Seven*, (London:

Macmillan, 1965), p. 306.

*14. Henry S. Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, (Durham: Duke University, 1983), p. 49.

*15. Mousavi, *Hazaras*, p. 219, note 1).

*16. Actually, there was a dispute among the Doshi Isma`ilis over whether Sayyed Mansur Nadiri (or his older brother) should head the Isma`ilis. Most Isma`ilis presumed Nâsir Naderi to be the mukki and Mansur Nadiri his deputy. But a story was going around that no one had yet been appointed mukki. It was said that when Nâsir Naderi went to see the Agha Khan in Paris the Agha Khan refused to see him because he had agreed to support the government. It was said that Isma`ili authorities in Karachi affirmed that no one had been designated mukki yet. At the Isma`ili Center in London Sayyed Nâsir Naderi was being referred to as Mukki Nâsir in 1990. I was unable to reach him personally.

Also there were tensions between the Doshi Isma`ilis and the Shughnani Isma`ilis (Hafizullah Emadi, "The End of Taqiyya: Reaffirming the Religious Identity of Ismailis in Shughnan, Badakhshan -- Political Implications for Afghanistan," *Middle Eastern Studies* 34, no. 3, 1998), pp. 103-120.

*17. Sayyed Mansur was accused of playing a double game in the war. One person (in 1996) expressed the belief to me that Mansur passed information to Mas`ud, the anti-communist commander of Panjsher. Mousavi (1999: 187) says "the Isma`ili Hazaras ... supported both the government and the resistance." But a person who worked closely with Mansur assured me (in 1996) that Mansur's commitment to the Parchami regime was genuine. He accepted his position with the government (I was told) because his people were vulnerable. As the government, for its part, lacked support in most of the rural areas and, as Sayyed Mansur's strength lay in the rural area to the north, both sides had an interest in alliance. Throughout most of the 1980s Sayyed Mansur's forces were relatively unengaged but they did come under attack from the Shi`a organization Harakat-i Islami, and at least once the Isma`ili forces fought the (Sunni) Jami`at-i Islami.

*18. Kristian Berg Harpviken, "Political Mobilization among the Hazara of Afghanistan: 1978-1992," (Oslo: Institutt for Sosiologi, Universitetet i Oslo (M.A. Thesis), 1986), p. 81.

*19. Ibid, p. 96.

*20. Ibid, p. 83.

*21. Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal* (Oxford: Oxford University, 1995).

- *22.Harpviken, *Political Mobilization*, p. 94 ff.
- *23.Ibid, p. 104-5.
- *24.Mousavi, *Hazaras*, p. 187.
- *25.David Busby Edwards, "The Evolution of Shi'i Political Dissent in Afghanistan," *Shi'ism and Social Protest*, edited by J. R. I. Cole and N. R. Keddi, Yale University Press, p. 223.
- *26.Hafizullah Emadi, "The Hazaras and their Role in the Process of Political transformation in Afghanistan," (*Central Asian Survey*, Vol 16, No 3, 1997), p. 376.
- *27Harpviken, *Political Mobilization*, p. 75)
- *28.Ibid., p. 77
- *29.Olivier Roy (*Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*, Cambridge:Cambridge University, 1990 [1986], p. 142) says there were nine wulayats.
- *30.Ibid.p, 142-43.
- *31.Emadi, "Hazaras and their Role", p. 376.
- *32.Behisti like Muhsini had studied in Iraq with Ayatullah Sayyed Abul Qasim?i K---ho`i, with whom he also retained ties. Loyalty to Kho`i may have been a way the Afghanistan Shi`a expressed their independence from Iranian Shi`ism.I once asked a Hazara in Quetta, who had some knowledge of the organization, if adherence to Kho`i meant opposition to Khomeini.He insisted that the party was merely separate; they did not approve or disapprove of Khomeini.
- *33.An Afghan from Hazarajat said to me,"Iran sent people into Afghanistan to take it for Iran.In 1361 [1982-3] they started fighting, and two years later the Shura was very weak."An attempt at rapprochement with Iran in 1989 by a prominent figure in the Shura organization was repudiated by other members.
- *34.Edwards, *Evolution*, p. 226.
- *35. Harpviken, *Political Mobilization*, p. 88.
- *36.Emadi, "Hazaras and Their Role," p. 377.
- *37.Edwards, *Evolution*, p. 226-7)
- *38.Harpviken, *Political Mobilization*, p. 74 ff.On conflicts between Quetta-based secular groups and Islamic groups in 1980-81 see Rolf Bindemann, *Religion und Politik bei den schiitischen Hazara in Afghanistan, Iran und Pakistan* (Das Araqbische Buch, Berlin, 1987), pp. 62-64.

- *39. Edwards, *Evolution*, p. 227; see also, Emadi, "Hazaras and Their Role", p. 377.
- *40. Neyru was considered "very successful" by N. Haqshinas, *Russia's Intrigues and Crimes in Afghanistan* [in Dari] (Cultural Committee, The Islamic Association of Afghanistan, Tehran, 1985), p. 36.
- *41. Edwards, *Evolution*, p. 225.
- *42. Harpviken, *Political Mobilization*, pp. 79-80.
- *43. Harpviken, *Political Mobilization*, pp. 86 ff.; Olivier Roy, *L'Afghanistan d'est en ouest: Compte rendu de voyage 1982. Les Nouvelles of Afghanistan*, no 12-13 (1983), pp. 49-51.
- *44. Harpviken, *Political Mobilization*, p. 84 ff. This section, as well as much of the paper, is indebted to Harpviken for giving us his report on the period of confusion in Kabul in 1991-1992.
- *45. *Ibid.*, pp. 85 ff.
- *46. *Ibid.*, p. 88.
- *47. *Ibid.*, p. 95.
- *48. *Ibid.*, p. 95.
- *49. *Ibid.*, p. 94.
- *50. *Ibid.*, p. 97.
- *51. *Ibid.*, p. 94.
- *52. *Ibid.*, 104.
- *53. *Ibid.*, pp. 94+; 100 ff.
- *54. *Ibid.*, pp. 102-3).
- *55. *Ibid.*, p. 103.
- *56. *Ibid.*, pp. 104 and ff.
- *57. *Ibid.*, p. 108.
- *58. Mousavi, *Hazaras*, p. 192-194.
- *59. *Ibid.*, p. 195.
- *60. Harpviken, *Political Mobilization*, p. 115.
- *61. Barnett R. Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System*, (Yale University, 1995), p. 152.
- *62. Harpviken, *Political Mobilization*, p. 110.
- *63. Hafizullah Emadi, "Minority Group Politics: The Role of Ismailis in Afghanistan's Politics," *Central Asian*

Survey 12, no. 3, 1993, pp. 379-392; Emadi, *Taqiyya*; Rubin, *Fragmentation*, p. 270.

*64. Harpviken, *Political Mobilization*, pp. 110 ff.

*65. Marek Sliwinski, *Afghanistan 1978-87, War, Demography and Society*, (Central Asian Survey, Incidental Paper Series, no. 6, 1988, p. 18); Mousavi, *Hazaras*, p. 196.

*66. Harpviken, *Political Movements*, p. 109.

*67. It seems to be generally supposed that if the Americans had not ceased their involvement in Afghanistan in early 1990s the country would not have descended into such anarchy. That is not quite the way I see it. What I remember is that the US was allowing the Pakistani ISI to run the war against the Soviets, which meant that the US was effectively behind Pakistan policy. It was Pakistan's policy to support G. Hikmatyar, and Pakistan's policy to encourage the battle for Kabul that pitted Hikmatyar's forces against the Hazaras and the Tajiks. In addition the US was allowing the Saudis to support Sayyaf's party, which also brutally attacked the Hazaras in Kabul. If the Americans had been involved it is possible that they would have been implicated in the slaughter of the people of Kabul. What is new now is that the United States is not relying on Pakistan to run the war against the Taliban. And it has forced Pakistan to backtrack on its support for the Taliban. For a different view see Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, *Afghanistan: The Bear Trap* (Casemate, Havertown, PA, 1992).

*68. Harpviken, *Political Mobilization*, p. 113.

*69. *Ibid.*, p. 110.

*70. Mousavi, *Hazaras*, pp. 196-198.

*71. Cheryl Benard, *Veiled Courage*, (New York: Broadway Books, 2002).

*72. One feature of the Hazara community that augurs well for their future is their avowed emphasis on education. As an educated Hazara wrote me in 2001, "This is probably where Hazaras are currently distinguishing themselves. There are more schools probably in the mountains today than ever, and if what we hear is correct it may be the only place technically under Taliban control that still has girls going to school. Beginning under the communists, Hazaras in particular saw education as the way off the bottom rung of the social ladder, and their pursuit of it $\frac{1}{4}$ has become only stronger in recent years. Resources are meager, but funds are raised both locally and internationally. $\frac{1}{4}$ These are mostly more independent type schools, though Iran is weighing in a lot, as well. Curriculum is not like the Sunni Madrassahs, but much wider -? a point even the Iranian schools pride themselves on -?"

including English and computers."According to another educated Hazara, "[e]ven before the Taliban appeared a university had begun [via some] relationship with the university of Balkh in Mazar-i Sharif. Those involved were Hazaras from Kabul who had fled to Mazar. ¼ [Also] in the mountains schools have actually multiplied and may have been the only place where girls were attending classes. All locally supported."