

- "Narrative Strukturen des Erzählens über Heilige und ihre Gräber in Afghanistan," *Asiatische Studien* 58, no. 1 (2004): 195–229.
18. Informant: Gholam Nabi Sherzi, 27 years old, herdsman from Kang, illiterate, Baluch; date and place of the recording: August 23, 2002, Zaranj, province of Nimroz, Afghanistan (recorded during a gathering in the house of Gholam Sakhi Sherzi); language: Baluchi, Persian.
  19. Informant: Ahmad Shah Khan, about 40 years old, head of the intelligence agency of the province of Nimroz, Farsiwan; date and place of the recording: April 16, 2005, Zaranj, province of Nimroz, Afghanistan (recorded during a meeting of male elders of the Nurzi tribe in the house of Gholam Nabi Sherzi); language: Persian (*farsi-ye kaboli*—colloquial standard of Afghanistan).
  20. See Rzehak, *Die Taliban im Land der Mittagssonne*.
  21. A more detailed analysis of the narrative structure of this 191-page manuscript is given in *ibid.*, xvii–xxv.
  22. James Darmesteter, *Chants populaires des Afghans* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale E. Leroux, 1888–1890), cxvix. The history of Afghanistan to which he refers is John William Kaye's *History of the War in Afghanistan*, 3 vols. (London, 1857).
  23. See 'Abdullah Bakhtani, *Turbresh ya nelli sandari* (Kabul, 1347 [1968]), 78–79. A literary analysis of the genre of *charbayta* in Pashto folk literature is given by G. F. Girs, ed. and trans., *Istoricheskie pesni pusbunov* (Moscow: Nauka, 1984), 30.
  24. The song is published here as given by Girs, *Istoricheskie pesni pusbunov*, 107.
  25. See L. R. Gordon-Polonskaia, "Voina Afganistana za nezavisimost' i uchastie v nei pogramichnykh pusbunskikh plemen (1919–1921 gg.)," in *Nezavisimyi Afganistan: 40 let nezavisimosti* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo vostochnoi literatury, 1958), 253.
  26. See L. W. Adamec, *Historical and Political Who's Who of Afghanistan* (Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1975), 122–123.
  27. For further details, see Girs, *Istoricheskie pesni pusbunov*.
  28. See L. A. Stroprsova, ed., *Kratkaia istoriia literatury Irana, Turtsii i Afganistana* (Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1971), 75.
  29. See [Duktur] Asadullah Habib, *Adabiyat-e dari dar nima-ye nakbustin-e sada-ye bistum*, 2nd ed. (Kabul: Nasir Ahmad Multahib, 1381 [2002]).
  30. Very few scholars can prove the transience of such folklore within their own scholarly careers. George Morgenstierne started his linguistic fieldwork in Afghanistan in the early 1920s. When he went to Afghanistan in 1970, he read some historical songs in the Parachi language that he had recorded in 1924 to the direct descendants of his informants from the 1920s. They knew not one single song and regarded Morgenstierne as the greatest bard of their people. "Volksdichtung in Afghanistan," 7.
  31. "One says one thing, the other another."
  32. Informant: Gholam Sakhi Sherzi, about 30 years old, trader (author of the song: Zaher Baluch); date and place of recording: August 28, 2002, Zaranj, province of Nimroz, Afghanistan; language: Baluchi.
  33. Informant: Zaher Baluch (author), 40 years old, poet and singer, Baluch; date and place of recording: September 12, 2002, Zaranj, province of Nimroz, Afghanistan (concert at a private gathering); language: Baluchi.
  34. Zaher Baluch accompanied his songs and these introductions with a stringed instrument, called a *suroz*, played with a bow. Both of his hands were occupied, so he held with his toes the sheet of paper with the names he had to mention.
6. Fraternity, Power, and Time in Central Asia
- I am indebted to Sami Siddiq for comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Nothing in the paper, however, is his responsibility.
1. John Kifner, "Through the Serbian Mind's Eye," *New York Times*, April 10, 1994.
  2. *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Caucasus Report* 7, no. 29 (July 23, 2004).
  3. Vicken Cheterian, "Where Is Juma Namangani?" *Eurasia Insight*, July 17, 2000.
  4. Admittedly, in many cases the leaders of these movements were urbanites and essentially secular in their orientation; Franjo Trudman in Croatia and Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia were notable examples. Also, the leaders of the radical Islamist movements in Central Asia were something other than they appeared. Social movements are in fact complex in their moral inspiration.
  5. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1991), 36.
  6. Kathryn Verdery, *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Post-socialist Change* (New York: Columbia University, 1999), 104ff. Each "people" should have a place, a land of their own. It was, for instance, Richard Wagner's vision for the German people of Europe: In his diary he wrote: "the incomparable magic of my works . . . it is German. But what is this German? It must be something wonderful, mustn't it, for it is humanly finer than all else?—Oh heavens! It should have a soil, this German! I should be able to find my people! What glorious people it

- ought to become." See Richard Wagner, *The Diary of Richard Wagner, 1865–1882: The Brown Book*, presented and annotated by Joachim Bergfeld, trans. George Byrd. (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1980), 73.
7. Bruce Kapferer, *Legends of People, Myths of State: Violence, Intolerance, and Political Culture in Sri Lanka and Australia* (Washington DC: Smithsonian, 1988), 1.
  8. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 9.
  9. Loreta Napoleoni, *Modern Jihad: Tracing the Dollars behind the Terror Networks* (London: Pluto, 2003), 98–99.
  10. Nazif Shahrani, "Islam and the Political Culture of 'Scientific Atheism' in Post-Soviet Central Asia: Future Predicaments," in *The Politics of Religion in Russia and the New States of Central Asia*, ed. Michael Bourdoux (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 1995), 279.
  11. Kristian Berg Harpviken, *Political Mobilization among the Hazara of Afghanistan: 1978–1992* (Oslo: Institutt for Sociologi, Universitetet i Oslo, 1996).
  12. In 1989 I visited the bookstore of a madrasa in Peshawar. There, prominently displayed in a window facing the street, was a large map, in Persian, of the early Muslim conquests in the first two centuries of Islam. It was a vivid portrayal of the imaginative world in which the students were trained. See also Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).
  13. Rashid, *Taliban*, 184; and Napoleoni, *Modern Jihad*, 92.
  14. Napoleoni, *Modern Jihad*, 88–92.
  15. *Ibid.*, 147.
  16. See Robert Crews's chapter "Modern Taliban?" in this book.
  17. Rashid, *Taliban*, 41.
  18. I use the term *clergy* deliberately. In Islam there is no clergy in the sense found in the Roman Catholic or Orthodox churches, but the loose affiliation of religious specialists in some Protestant denominations, such as the Baptists, is scarcely different from the associations of religious specialists in Afghanistan: their relationships and the importance of various members of the informal networks are determined by reputation and numbers of followers.
  19. Rashid, *Taliban*.
  20. *Ibid.*, 133–134.
  21. *Ibid.*, 139.
  22. In his oral presentation at the conference "A Decade of the Taliban" at Stanford University, May 6–7, 2004, Thomas Barfield noted that the

Taliban who invaded in Mazar-e Sharif the second time included many non-Afghans.

23. See Neamatollah Nojumi's chapter "The Rise and Fall of the Taliban" in this book.
24. *Ibid.*; and Crews, "Moderate Taliban," in this book.
25. Rashid, *Taliban*, 140.
26. Napoleoni, *Modern Jihad*, 97.
27. Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy, *Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 53.
28. Syed Saleem Shahzad, "Cracking Open Pakistan's Jihadi Core," *Asia Times Online*, August 12, 2004.
29. *Ibid.*; and Zahab and Roy, *Islamist Networks*, 14. See Zahab and Roy for extensive information on the Islamist organizations in Pakistan. Here I have chosen to ignore the topic of another kind of person who has been involved in Islamist organizations, namely, Western-educated aliens. Several scholars have noted that "terrorists" are usually more highly educated than the rest of the population. (See, for example, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, "Conciliation, Counter-Terrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence: A Comparative Study of Four Cases," paper presented at the meeting of the International Studies Association, February 2003; and Bueno de Mesquita, "The Quality of Terror," paper presented at the meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2003.) The rank-and-file Taliban are of course essentially educated in the memorization of the Quran. But associated with the broader movement of al-Qaeda are Islamist Muslims educated in Western subjects. The most notorious of them, perhaps, is Sheikh Omar, who was instrumental in the murder of Daniel Pearl. Omar is a British citizen, educated in Britain, a matriculant of LSE, a former student of Anthony Giddens—certainly not the kind of person we would expect to remind the entrapment, murder, and dismemberment of a *Wall Street Journal* reporter. See Bernard-Henri Lévy, *Who Killed Daniel Pearl?* (Hoboken, NJ: Melville House, 2003). No doubt there are others like him who, despite a Western education, have embraced the broad ideals of the Islamist movement. It is well known that some of the leaders of the movement are more highly educated—notably, of course, Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri—than most of the rank-and-file al-Qaeda.
30. The funding and perhaps the motive of these operations could have been the narcotics trade the ISI controlled. Napoleoni says that "the narcotics-based economy took over the traditional agrarian economy of Afghanistan [during the Soviet mujahedin war] and, with the help of

ISI, the Mujahedin opened hundreds of heroin laboratories. Within two years the Pakistani-Afghanistan borderland had become the biggest center for the production of heroin in the world [no date but presumably late 1980s] . . . By 1991, yearly production from the tribal area under the control of the Mujahedin had risen to an astonishing 70 metric tons of premium quality heroin, up 35% from the previous year" (Napoleoni, *Modern Jihad*, 83, 87–88).

31. Shahzad, "Cracking Open Pakistan's Jihadi Core"; and Zahab and Roy, *Islamist Networks*, 35.
32. Arnaud de Borchgrave, "Outside View: Focus on Pakistan's Jihads," United Press International, August 9, 2004. Borchgrave cites the 2003 report of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan for some of these details.
33. Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2005), 134.
34. Arnaud de Borchgrave, "Pakistan's ISI 'Fully Involved' in 9/11," United Press International, August 3, 2004.
35. Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism*, 224.
36. Borchgrave, "Pakistan's ISI."
37. Ibid. At the Deobandi school in Karachi there is a large image of the now-deceased leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Juma Namangi. That this Uzbek Islamic leader is portrayed as a hero reveals, again, that their moral horizon, and the range of Islamic causes and leaders that interests them, is international. See Lévy, *Who Killed Daniel Pearl?*
38. "Waziristan a Taliban Mimi State," *News International*, April 27, 2007.
39. Borchgrave, "Outside View."
40. Stephen Philip Cohen, "The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan," *Washington Quarterly* 26, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 7–25.
41. Tariq Ali, "Pakistan on the Brink," *The Nation*, April 17, 2000.
42. Elizabeth Rubin, "In the Land of the Taliban," *New York Times* October 22, 2006.
43. Ali, "Pakistan on the Brink." The duplicitous policy created strange contradictions: when the United States moved to retaliate for the September 11, 2001, attack, the ISI posted several thousand Pakistanis in Afghanistan to fight alongside the Taliban. See Shahzad, "Cracking Open Pakistan's Jihadi Core"; and Seymour Hersh, "The Getaway: Questions Surround a Secret Pakistani Airlift," *New Yorker*, January 28, 2002. And once the Taliban were defeated, Hersh notes: "The United States Central Command . . . set up a special air corridor to help insure the safety of the Pakistani rescue flights from Kunduz." "Pakistanis were . . . flown to

safety, in a series of nighttime airlifts that were approved by the Bush Administration." "Many of the people they spirited away were the Taliban leadership," and "two Pakistani Army generals were on the flights."

44. Cohen, "The Jihadist Threat," 7, 10.
45. Ali, "Pakistan on the Brink."
46. This section relies mainly on the following sources: Sarah Chayes, "The Night Fairies," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 62 no. 2 (March–April 2006): 17–19; Barnett Rubin, "Saving Afghanistan," *Foreign Affairs* 86, no. 1 (January–February 2007); Rubin, "In the Land of the Taliban"; Graham Usher, "The Pakistan Taliban," *Middle East Report Online*, February 13, 2007. Other sources can be found on the blog "Vital Concerns for the World" (rcanfield.blogspot.com).
47. Rubin, "Saving Afghanistan," 5.
48. Pamela Constable, "Pakistan's Untamed Frontier: Army's Anti-Terror Offensive Finds Little Support in Semi-Autonomous Tribal Areas," *Washington Post*, April 7, 2004; and *Asia Times Online*, July 20, 2004.
49. Usher, "The Pakistan Taliban."
50. The source of this summary of recent affairs is Usher, "The Pakistan Taliban."
51. Aimal Khan Farzi, "Radical Islamism and Talibanism: Tools of Pakistani Politics," [kabulpress.org/English\\_letters25.htm](http://kabulpress.org/English_letters25.htm).
52. "Waziristan a Taliban Mimi State," *News International*, April 27, 2007.
53. Rorella Sebastian, "War on West Shifts Back to Afghanistan," *Los Angeles Times*, October 26, 2006.
54. "Living Under the Taleban," *Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Afghan Recovery Report*, no. 249 (April 4, 2007).
55. Rubin, "In the Land of the Taliban."
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Napoleoni, *Modern Jihad*, 112.
59. John F. Burns, "The Struggle for Iraq: Ordeal, Anxious Moments in Grip of Outlaw Militia," *New York Times*, April 7, 2004.
60. "The Herat Koran Memorization School Has Condemned the Murder of the Hamas leader, Abd-al-Aziz al-Rantisi," Herat TV in Dari, April 18, 2004.
61. Mahmood Mamdani argues that groups like al-Qaeda are generally motivated by legitimate political grievances with U.S. foreign policy. He discusses in detail the failures of United States policy in respect to Afghanistan. See Mamdani, *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror* (New York: Pantheon, 2004).
62. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 36.

63. Note Nojumi's description, in his chapter in this book, of a teacher who claims that a nationalist cannot be a Muslim.
64. Pierre Bourdieu, *The Algerians* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), 187.
65. Amatzia Bram, "Praying for Sistani's Good Health," *New York Times*, August 22, 2004. Barry Cooper has an extended discussion, based on secondary sources, of the apocalyptic views of Islamist leaders. See his *New Political Religions, or an Analysis of Modern Terrorism* (Columbia: University of Missouri, 2004).
66. Zoya, with John Follian and Rita Cristofari, *Zoya's Story: An Afghan Woman's Struggle for Freedom* (New York: Morrow, 2002), 76.

#### 7. Moderate Taliban?

1. Ahmed Rashid uses the formulation in his classic study, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 104. Other observers have also identified "moderates" within the movement; see, for example, Barbara D. Metcalf, "Traditionalist/ Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs (Leiden: ISIM, 2002); and Thomas H. Johnson, "Afghanistan's Post-Taliban Transition: The State of State-Building after War," *Central Asian Survey* 25, nos. 1–2 (March–June 2006): 1–26. Kathy Gannon has devoted an entire chapter to them in *I is for Infidel: From Holy War to Holy Terror—18 Years inside Afghanistan* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 51–65.
2. John Heller, "Political Space Is Opening for Taliban Moderates, but Just How Moderate Are They?" *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Afghanistan Report* 2, no. 23 (July 3, 2003), www.rferl.org/reports. Golnaz Esfandiari, "Karzai Calls on Taliban to Participate in Elections," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Afghanistan Report* 3, no. 16 (April 28, 2004). In October 2003, however, the American commander of coalition forces, General David Borno, gave a slightly lower figure—between 100 and 150—for the number of Taliban who would not be welcomed to "become part of the future of Afghanistan." See Victoria Burnett, "US Backs Afghan Proposal to Woo Moderate Taliban," *Financial Times*, December 31, 2003. On Pakistani support for the inclusion of "moderate Taliban," see Luke Harding, "Taliban Moderates Offered Future Role," *The Guardian*, October 17, 2001; and Zahid Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), esp. 48.
3. See, for example, quotes from the women's journal *Payam-e zan* in R. R. Sikoev, *Talibiy (religiozno-politicheskiy portret)* (Moscow: Institut vosto-kovedeniia RAN, 2002), 115.

4. Amin Tarzi, "Demonstrators in Kabul Denounce Karzai and His Aides over Handling of Crisis in Fayab," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Afghanistan Report* 3, no. 16 (April 28, 2004).
5. N. C. Aizenman, "Four Senior Taliban Leaders Accept Amnesty," *Washington Post*, February 18, 2005.
6. "Afghan Warlords in Amnesty Rally," BBC News, February 23, 2007; Sayed Salahuddin, "Afghan Rally Demands Amnesty for War Crimes," Reuters, February 23, 2007. The text is quoted from "Afghan MPs' Reconciliation Plan Calls for Forgiving Past Deeds," Kabul Tolu Television, January 31, 2007. On the bill, see Amin Tarzi, "Amnesty Bill Places Karzai in Dilemma," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Afghanistan Report* 6, no. 5 (March 16, 2007).
7. See the tribunal documents at www.pentagon.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/index.html, 22–24. Note that the identity of "cook's assistant" was an accusation leveled by the American investigators and not, it seems, the detainee's alibi.
8. On Rahmatullah's adventures in the Ivy League, see Chip Brown, "The Freshman," *New York Times Magazine*, February 26, 2006, with remarkable photographs by Reuben Cox.
9. See Eric Hooglund, "The Search for Iran's 'Moderates,'" *Middle East Report*, no. 144 (January–February 1987): 4–6; and Mahmood Mamdani, *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror* (New York: Pantheon, 2004), esp. 20–27.
10. Quoted in Conrad Schetter, *Ethnizität und ethnische Konflikte in Afghanistan* (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag, 2003), 524.
11. See, for example, Pamela Constable, "Tales of the Taleban: Part Tragedy, Part Farce," *Washington Post*, February 28, 2004.
12. Wahid Muzhdah, *Afghanistan wa panj sal sulta-ye Taleban* (Tehran: Nashr-e ney, 1382 [2003]), 49–50.
13. Mark Kukis reports that Radio Voice of Sharia reached into the tribal areas of Pakistan where John Walker Lindh briefly studied; see Kukis, "My Heart Became Attached": *The Strange Journey of John Walker Lindh* (Washington: Brassey's, 2003), 58–59.
14. "Editorial: The Dynamic Address of Mulla Ameer Khan Muttaqi," *Dharr-i-Mu'min* 1, no. 12 (July 1, 1997), 3.
15. Maggie O'Kane, "A Holy Betrayal," *The Guardian*, November 29, 1997. See also Rashid, *Taliban*, for other examples of the seeming absence of Taliban attention to state building.
16. Norbert Heinrich Holl, *Mission Afghanistan: Erfahrungen eines UNO-Diplomaten* (Munich: Herbig, 2002), 115–122.