Simultaneously, British officials reportedly apprehended a major al- Qaida figure named Issa al-Hindi, alias Bilal, a British convert to  Islam of Indian descent as well as another man named Babar Ahmad,  who is supposedly a cousin of the Pakistani computer expert Noor  Khan. Five other British suspects of Pakistani descent reportedly  absconded. 

 Given that this is a presidential election year, the U.S media's  attention has naturally focused on the political aspect of these  anti-terror actions, but unfortunately the big picture analysis is  once again lacking. While these arrests do represent a sizable blow  to al-Qaida's network in Pakistan and Britain, they also bring to  the fore the organic and symbiotic nexus between al-Qaida and the  Pakistani jihadist groups.

 For instance, the Tanzanian Ghailani was arrested from the safe  house of the Pakistani group Lashkar-e-Taiba, or LeT. Noor Khan, the  computer whiz, is reportedly a member of the Jaish-e-Mohammed - JeM - - group. In addition, Issa al-Hindi, the British al-Qaida kingpin  reportedly spent time with Pakistani jihadist groups in Kashmir  years ago. Most of the other British terror suspects were of  Pakistani descent and have spent time with jihadist groups, many  sponsored by the Pakistani government, in Kashmir or Afghanistan.  The New York Times reported last week that yet another Pakistani  group Harkat-ul-Mujahideen has recently been training volunteers in  Pakistan to stage attacks on U.S troops in Afghanistan. For the  U.S., these are clear indicators that the war on terror cannot be  won without extirpating the Pakistani jihadist infrastructure. 

 Some argue that a U.S. demand to Pakistan to shut down every single  jihadist group operating in that country is unrealistic and unfair  to the Musharraf regime. Indeed, there is a powerful clique of  religious parties and their supporters within the military-feudal  establishment in Pakistan who are sympathetic to the jihadist cause,  especially in Kashmir and Afghanistan. But what the U.S. can and  should demand from Musharraf is to remove the blatant state  tolerance and support for these groups. Some specifics are useful in  understanding this point.

 In January 2002, Gen. Musharraf banned the LeT, JeM and HuM. Even  before the ink dried on the proscription papers, these groups  renamed themselves. Soon, the crackdown turned into a revolving door  for terrorists. While more than 2,000 people were arrested following  the 2002 ban, all but a handful were released after a few weeks. But  what happened with the leaders was shameful. Jaish chief Masood  Azhar, HuM chief Fazlur Rehman-Khalil and Lashkar's Emir Hafiz Saeed  were whisked away to the safe houses of Pakistan's intelligence  service, ISI. After a few months of R&R, they were released without  any charges being pressed against them. Even when in detention, the  terrorist leaders enjoyed peculiarly lenient conditions, with some  receiving a stipend of 10,000 rupees ($300) a month, as the Human  Rights Commission of Pakistan noted in its 2003 annual report. 

 While Musharraf claimed that he let the legal process run its  course, what he did not say was that the terrorist chiefs could have  been prosecuted under existing Pakistani anti-terror laws, which  were retroactive. A top al-Qaida leader, Abu Zubeida was found  hiding in a LeT safe house. Pakistani authorities are on the record  stating that Jaish-e-Mohammed terrorists had been responsible for a  series of church bombings in Pakistan, including one that killed  Americans. As the leaders of their respective groups, there was  plenty of evidence against Saeed and Azhar. 

 Interestingly, the local LeT chief Hameedullah Niazi, who was  sheltering Abu Zubeida, as well as those LeT figures harboring the  Indonesian terrorist Gunawan, were released without charge. 

 Once freed in 2003, the terrorist leaders barnstormed around the  country, recruiting volunteers for Jihad in Kashmir, Afghanistan and  even Iraq. Some of the rallies were conducted in military property,  addressing Pakistani troops, which indicates a high level of state  collusion. 

 In November 2003, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Nancy Powell, issued  an unusually stern speech castigating Pakistan for allowing groups  like Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba to operate even after  being banned. Such statements are unheard of in the diplomatic  realm. Musharraf announced a new set of proscriptions following that  rebuke. But it too was no less farcical than before. While Musharraf  re-banned the latest incarnation of the Jaish, he put the Lashkar-e- Taiba's new avatar only on a "watch list." The logic of placing a  previously banned terrorist group on a "watch list" and calling it a  crackdown is facetious to say the least. LeT chief Hafiz Saeed was  allowed to address a 150,000 strong rally, merely hours after the  latest "crackdown." In an interview to Australian TV, Musharraf  defended the leniency on LeT and even denied that he ever banned it. 

 To al-Qaida, the Pakistani pass to local jihadist groups represents a big gap in America's Global War on Terror. Al-Qaida's leaders know  that the bases of Pakistan's jihadists, like the 190-acre LeT  compound outside Lahore protected by barbed wire and bearded men  with Kalashnikov assault rifles as well as their network of safe  houses in Pakistani cities, provide a sanctuary for its remaining leadership to rest, recuperate and plan further attacks. In this  context, U.S. reluctance to pressure Pakistan to close the jihadist  loophole and focus mainly on preventing specific attacks is akin to  fighting serial arson with more fire trucks rather than catching the  arsonists. // Reports have come out over the weekend that Pakistan has arrested  HuM chief Fazlur Rehman-Khalil and Qari Saifullah Akhtar, who is the  chief of Harkatul-Jihad-i-Islami (HuJI), which is the parent group  of JeM and HuM and an outfit with a huge following in Pakistan's  military. How these Khalil and Akhtar are handled would be an  indicator of Musharraf's sincerity. If the terrorist leaders are  prosecuted and jailed for good, it would represent a big move on  Musharraf's part. On the other hand, if the two kingpins are  released after a few days, it would prove conclusively that  Musharraf is still performing his smoke and mirrors show. 

 Some experts opine that given that some jihadists have now targeted  Musharraf personally, the general's latest crackdown is real. That  is not a valid operating assumption. Not all of the Pakistani  jihadist groups have shown a willingness to confront Musharraf and  the Pakistan army. It is therefore unwise to assume that Musharraf  will automatically fight dangerous groups like the LeT or HuJI. It  is equally impolitic to assume that the confrontation between some  jihadi groups like Jaish-e-Mohammed and Musharraf cannot be replaced  by at least a temporary conciliation, similar to the deal negotiated  in the tribal areas in April. If the past is any pointer,  Musharraf's first option when confronted by local jihadists has been  to appease them, rather than take them on. 

 In any case, the U.S should not hesitate to insist on the  elimination of HuM, JeM, LeT and their ilk. In the immediate  aftermath of 9/11, it made sense not to push Musharraf too hard.  Since then, American economic aid and diplomatic support has allowed  Musharraf to strengthen his grip over Pakistan. It has been nearly  three years since Musharraf switched sides and the excuses are  wearing thin. At the current moment, the Pakistan's army has the  upper hand over the phalanx of jihadists within that nation, who,  according to some studies, number anywhere between 200,000 and 500,000. But the jihadist force in Pakistan is growing rapidly. In  another five to 10 years, they and their sympathizers in the  Pakistan army and intelligence services would likely overwhelm the  Pakistan establishment and even a well-meaning crackdown would  likely not stand a chance. 

 It is time therefore for America to make the rollback of Pakistan's  domestic terrorist infrastructure a top priority instead of simply  trying to thwart attacks on American targets. A good, solid near- term goal would be the prosecution of jihadist leaders like Khalil,  Akhtar and LeT's Hafiz Saeed followed by a verifiable shutdown of  all jihadist training camps in Pakistan and all the territories it  controls, including the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and  Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. 

 The stakes cannot be higher. If America lets Musharraf keep  Pakistani jihadists out of the war on terror, sooner or later they  are likely to help al-Qaida execute a successful, major terror  attack on America. After all, the terrorists only have to succeed  once.

                        (Kaushik Kapisthalam is a freelance
                        commentator on U.S. policy on South
                        Asia and its effects on the war on terror
                        and non-proliferation. He can be reached
                        at contact@kapisthalam.com)

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